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Designing employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship is a key prob-
lem in the modern firm theory. This dissertation investigates this problem from
three different angles, (1) the employment contracts in the labor market with pro-
crastinating workers; (2) the behavior of members and reciprocal leaders in group
competitions, where leaders can reward members discretionarily; (3) optimal em-
ployment contracts when tasks are endogenously designed.
For the chapter about the employment contracts as a commitment device,
I build an adverse selection model in a labor market of one firm against many
workers, where the workers, if self-employed, procrastinate due to their own quasi-
hyperbolic discounting. In the equilibrium, the model shows that workers with the
least procrastination are self-employed and workers with the most procrastination
are part-time employees in a separating equilibrium where the workers’ hiring con-
tracts differ by their quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In between, there exist specific
ranges of quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors, in each of which the workers sign the
same contract in a pooling equilibrium. This model leads to a position hierarchy
within the firm as well as separation of paid-employment and self-employment in
the labor market.
For the chapter about the behavior of reciprocal leaders and members in group
competitions, I model the model equilibrium when the leaders are reciprocal and
show the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium. A laboratory group all-pay
auctions was run to test for the model predictions.
For the chapter about the optimal employment contracts with endogenous
tasks, I examine the optimal job design in a principal-agent setting where tasks
are designed by the principal. The principal wants to incentivize agents to exert a
given desired amount of effort on an effort space; to minimize the cost of reaching
this goal, the principal can freely assign disjoint parts of the effort space to agents
as their jobs and partition each job into tasks. I provide a characterization of the
optimal number of agents to be hired and optimal partition of each agent’s job into
tasks.




Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the
University of Maryland, College Park in partial fulfillment




Professor Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Chair/Advisor









List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
1 Firm as a self-commitment device: Adverse selection of hyperbolic discount-
ing workers in workplaces 1
1.1 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.1 Procrastination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.1.2 Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.1.3 Contract Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Model Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3 Player’s Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.1 Self-Employed Worker’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.3.2 Employee’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3.3 Employer’s Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4 Optimal Contract Menu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.1 Employee’s Behavior at t=1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.2 Socially Optimal Pecuniary Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.5 Characterization of a Hybrid Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.6 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6.1 First Order Condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.6.2 Uniform Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.6.3 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.7.1 Self-Employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.7.2 Competitive Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
ii
2 Role of Leaders with Different Genders in Group All-Pay Auctions 46
2.1 Model Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Model Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Experiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3 A Principal-Agent Problem with an Endogenous Task Design 68
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3.2 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Model Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.3.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.3.2 General Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.3 Job Design Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.3.4 Task Design Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3.5 Signaling Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.4 Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.1 Task Design Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.4.2 Job Design Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
A Proofs in Chapter 1 93
A.1 Lemma 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
A.2 Lemma 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3 Preparation for Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
A.3.1 Employer’s profit from contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
A.4 Proposition 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.5 Theorem 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.6 Proposition 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.7 Proposition 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.8 Corollary 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.9 Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B Proofs in Chapter 2 110
B.1 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113




2.1 Regression of Reward on leader’s Gender and Bids . . . . . . . . . . . 62
iv
List of Figures
1.1 Timeline of the interaction between the firm and hired workers . . . . 12
1.2 Utility of self-employed workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.3 Utility of an employee with contract (e1(β
′), w(β′)). . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4 The worker’s utility as an employee or self-employed worker. . . . . . 22
1.5 Profit of the employer given set of positioned employees h and part-
time employees H \ h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.6 Separation of different jobs in the optimal contract menu . . . . . . . 33
2.1 Histogram of Bids to Female and Male Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
3.1 Task and job structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Timeline of the interaction between the principal and agents . . . . . 74
v
Chapter 1: Firm as a self-commitment device: Adverse selection of
hyperbolic discounting workers in workplaces
Introduction
In both lab and field experiments, evidence shows that workers procrastinate,
and many procrastinating workers intentionally employ commitment devices for self-
control ([1], [2], [3], [4] etc.). Additionally, evidence highlights the importance of
workers’ self-control in the development of workplace organizations (see [4] for a
discussion). For example, evidence implies that firms switched to stricter working
disciplines during the industrial revolution because the workers lacked self-control
[5]. Clark [5] further argues that ”Whatever the workers themselves thought, they
effectively hired the capitalists to discipline and coerce them.” Based on the evidence,
I build a model where sophisticated and procrastinating workers can choose to sign
hiring contracts as self-commitment devices for self-control. I also investigate the
model’s implication on labor market structure, firm structure, and public policy.
The model suggests the importance of workers’ self-control in their choices
for self-employment. This is supported by anecdotal stories and online columns
emphasizing self-control for business owners and independent researchers. For ex-
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ample, an article in Forbes.com 1 argues that it is one key sign for a person to fit
in self-employed jobs if she is ”a disciplined self-starter”. In another article giving
advice of time-management to self-employed workers, the author states in the first
paragraph that time-management/self-control is more important for self-employed
workers than for employees. 2 Specifically, while self-employed workers face the chal-
lenges of time-management due to their comparatively unstructured work, employees
in a firm typically have a more structured working environment with explicit dead-
lines and tasks, which is helpful in solving employees’ self-control problems. Hence,
the trade-off between self-employment and paid-employment for the procrastinating
workers can lead to a certain structure of the labor market, where paid-employment
is more favorable to more procrastinating workers.
I will briefly illustrate my model in this following example. Imagine a pro-
grammer who can either be an employee or a self-employed worker, for example, to
develop an App at home. If self-employed, the programmer decides how many hours
to spend on coding and how many hours on some costly non-pecuniary activity, for
example, exercising in the gym. Assume that both coding and exercising are costly
for the programmer but will return positive payoffs in the future. Although the
programmer would plan to do lots of coding and exercising beforehand, she knows
that she would not do so when the time comes due to her procrastination. Instead,
she can sign a hiring contract for coding with a software firm. Suppose that with
1”13 Signs You Are Meant To Be Self-Employed,” Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/glassheel/2012/04/12/13-signs-you-are-meant-to-be-self-
employed/#5205730f275e
2”How to Manage Your Time if You Are a Self-Employed Worker,” Geston,
https://facilethings.com/blog/en/self-employed-time-management.html
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perfect monitoring, the firm is able to make its employees fulfill the contracted cod-
ing effort. So the worker will code harder by contracting a high amount of coding for
self-control while the firm can pay a higher wage to the worker and still be profitable
because of the worker’s higher productivity. If the expected utility when signing the
hiring contract is higher than being self-employed, the worker will sign the contract,
as the contract works as a self-commitment device which controls for the worker’s
procrastination.
In the above example, both the employee and the employer benefit from the
hiring contract: the employee earns a higher utility, while the employer is able to
extract a certain ”commitment rent” by offering this self-commitment device to the
employee. One property of this example is that the contracted pecuniary effort will
crowd out the non-pecuniary effort. As a result, if the payoff from non-pecuniary
effort is large, the worker will never accept a contract with too much pecuniary
effort. This reflects a desire for work-life balance of the worker, that a worker will
not accept a job which will make her too busy to deal with her own business using
non-pecuniary effort.
As in the programmer’s example, the firm can offer hiring contracts to workers
to control for their procrastination in this model. I use workers’ quasi-hyperbolic
discounting factors to represent their procrastination (see, for example, [6]; [7]). As
in the example, I assume that workers can exert two different efforts: the ”pecu-
niary” effort returns payoff also valuable to the firm and can thus be contracted,
and the ”non-pecuniary” effort returns payoff only valuable to the worker and thus
cannot be contracted. I assume a step payoff function for the non-pecuniary effort,
3
which is just the commonly accepted ”fixed cost” production function, and a linear
payoff function for pecuniary effort, which can be justified by the existence of the
labor market for the pecuniary effort.
Assume that the firm/employer is a monopsonist in offering hiring contracts. 3
As the worker’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor is private information, the firm
offers a contract menu to the workers. Each worker can choose a contract from the
menu to sign, or remain self-employed. This introduces an adverse-selection problem
where a worker’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor is the worker’s type. The equi-
librium of this model is a hybrid one: the workers with the highest quasi-hyperbolic
discounting factors and thus the least procrastination will be self-employed; the
workers with the lowest quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors and the most procras-
tination will be in the separating equilibrium with working hours and payments
differing on their types. A ”position hierarchy” arises for the medium type work-
ers. Each position is a range of workers’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors where
workers sign the same hiring contract with same working hours and pay. 4 I refer to
this job in the pooling equilibrium as a ”firm position” because in reality, full-time
workers in a given firm with a given job are typically paid similar wages and work
similar hours every day, in contrast to part-time workers who have more heterogene-
ity in hours and wages. Hence, I regard workers in the separating equilibrium as
the model counterparts to real-life part-time workers, while workers in the pooling
equilibrium are the model counterparts to real-life full-time workers. In this model,
3See the discussion for a perfectly competitive market in Section 6.
4Note that there may exist ranges of quasi-hyperbolic discounting for separating equilibrium
between two positions for pooling equilibrium.
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given the worker’s type, being a full-time worker in the pooling equilibrium yields
an extra information rent to the worker, compared to being a part-time worker in
the separating equilibrium. This gives a new explanation for the ’part-time penalty’
[8], the fact that part-time workers earn less than full-time workers after controlling
for measurable characteristics of workers and jobs. With the finding that the most
procrastinating workers tend to be part-time, this result also implies a disadvantage
for the workers with low cognitive abilities, for example, lack of self-control, pointed
out by [9]. The model thus provides a further argument for supporting programs
that aim to improve the non-cognitive abilities of children from poor backgrounds
to prepare them for the future labor market.
In addition, in the equilibrium of the model, the higher utility of self-employed
workers does not come from the higher income but from a lower exerted pecuniary
effort. The model thus implements Hurst and Pugsley [10]’s suggestion for non-
monetary benefit, as a reason for workers to enter into self-employment despite the
lower average income of self-employed workers [11]. Finally, I investigate the impli-
cations of the model for policies such as ceilings of working hours and wage. With
a uniform distribution of workers’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting and other plausible
assumptions about the model parameters, the model predicts that a properly de-
signed ceiling of working hours can increase both the workers’ surplus and social
welfare. The effect of wage ceilings, however, is ambiguous in this model.
Although time-inconsistency is usually considered as an unobservable char-
acteristic of workers, there is indirect evidence implying its relation with workers’
labor market performance. Through both experiments and brain activation images,
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research in neuroscience shows a negative correlation between time-inconsistent be-
havior and people’s personality trait of conscientiousness. Furthermore, the per-
sonality trait of conscientiousness has been shown to have a positive correlation
to subjects’ choices of entrepreneurship and is perceived by human resource de-
partments as an even more important fact for employees’ career success than the
employees’ cognitive ability. [12]
In following Section 1.1, I will discuss the relevant literature. In Section 1.2,
I will set up the model and spell out the key assumptions. Section 1.3 defines each
player’s problem. I will then discuss the properties of the equilibrium and solve the
model in Section 1.4. Implications of the analysis for public policies will be given in/




In behavioral economics, procrastination of an agent is often modeled as quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (see [13] and [7]), with the utility function




where β ∈ [0, 1] is the quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor of the agent and (c0, ..., cT )
is the agent’s consumption from period 0 to period T . When β < 1, the relative
importance of the current utility compared to the future utility is higher than that
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in the comparison of the same pairs of utility assessed in the previous period. As a
result, the agent may change her choice to more enjoyment and less effort when the
decisions become current, contradicting her previous plans such as working hard,
saving a lot, and eating healthy. In this sense, the agent is ”time-inconsistent.”
δ ∈ [0, 1] is the traditional intertemporal discounting factor, which I will normalize
to one for all the players, to focus the model on the role of workers’ quasi-hyperbolic
discounting β in players’ decisions.
Researchers show that sophisticated people anticipating their procrastination
will intentionally apply self-commitment devices to limit their flexibility of deviation
from the ”plan”. For instance, field experiments ([2]; [3]; [4] etc.) show that pro-
crastinating workers in workplaces would like to use costly commitment devices, and
the likelihood of the application of commitment devices is positively correlated with
the workers’ time-inconsistency. Consistent with the idea that workers sign hiring
contracts to self-control, evidence implies the role of self-control in the development
of workplace organizations (see discussion in [4]). For example, it is shown that dur-
ing the industrial revolution, workers under flexible working hours and piece-rate
pay had unsteady attendance and hours, spent a lot of time socializing at work,
and concentrated effort in the latter half of the week leading up to paydays. [5]
Clark [5] argues that this low productivity of workers made firms gradually switch
to the strict factory discipline, that is, strict working hours, and workers accepted
this arrangement due to the awareness of their lack of self-control. This evidence




This chapter separates itself from other works about the market equilibrium
of time-inconsistent agents by investigating sophisticated workers’ behavior in a
labor market setting where workers face trade-offs between contractable/pecuniary
and uncontractable/non-pecuniary efforts. Previous research often focuses on the
exploit of näıve players in the market ([6]; [14]; [15] etc.) and on the markets where
time-inconsistent agents face a trade-off between commitment versus flexibility [16].
In contrast, in this model, there is no future uncertainty and, therefore, no need
for flexibility. With the labor market setting of this model, sophisticated workers
face the trade-off between contractable and uncontractable actions when choosing
the hiring contracts as commitment devices. The equilibrium highlights a market
structure with workers’ contracted effort differing according to their types, and
workers in the equilibrium will never be worse-off with the hiring contracts, if not
benefit from them.
The model predicts that given a level of procrastination, employees in a sepa-
rating equilibrium earn a lower wage than employees in a pooling equilibrium. Note
that, in the model, types of workers who fully separate in the equilibrium correspond
to real-world part-time employees who are paid based on working hours with a more
diversified income. And the pooling employees correspond to full-time workers in
reality, who have similar working hours and close incomes in a given firm position.
So this result can explain the empirical observation of wage penalty for part-time
workers, thus explaining the puzzling lower income of part-time workers compared to
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full-time workers after controlling for the measurable job and worker characteristics.
[8]
The model also contributes to the literature of self-employment where a stable
lower income with higher variance is observed for self-employed workers than for em-
ployees ([17]; [11] etc.). To explain this observation, Hurst and Pugsley [10] suggest
non-monetary benefits such as ”more flexibility” and ”being one’s own boss” as an
important reason for self-employment. Consistent with Hurst et al [10]’s finding, in
the equilibrium of this model, the higher utility of the self-employed workers comes
from their lower exerted pecuniary effort instead of a higher income. The model thus
implies a theoretical implication of Hurst and Pugsley’s ”non-monetary” benefit of
self-employment, which explains why people enter into self-employment despite the
average lower income of self-employment.
1.1.3 Contract Structure
As a hierarchy arises within the firm based on the workers’ quasi-hyperbolic
discounting in the equilibrium, this chapter is related to the literature of firm hier-
archy. The traditional theories justify the firm’s hierarchy as a structure to solve
the moral-hazard problem in the principal-agent setting, that is, managers are hired
to monitor the workers/agents, in order to keep them from shirking. 5 This chapter
offers a new explanation for a firm’s hierarchy as a consequence of the firm’s optimal
contract menu, which maximizes its profit in a labor market with workers who have
different tendencies of procrastination.
5See [18] for a literature review of studies about firm hierarchy.
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This model also relates to the literature about low-powered incentives, which
is a motive scheme where the workers get the promotion or are fired discretely by
their performance instead of claiming part of their production as in the continuous
piece-rate pay [19]. The traditional model justifies the popularity of low-powered
incentives in workplaces by cost of possible opportunism ([19]), imperfect observ-
ability of tasks (see, for example, [20], [21]) or worker heterogeneity [22]. With the
mere idea that workers use hiring contracts as commitment devices, this model of-
fers a simple alternative explanation: as a commitment device for procrastinating
workers, the hiring contract must impose a discrete punishment, for example, firing
the worker, once an established goal of effort exerting is not accomplished.
1.2 Model Setting
A worker/agent can decide to either work by herself in self-employment or
sign a contract with an employer/principal as an employee at t = 0. There are two
different types of effort e1, e2 ∈ R+ that the worker can exert at t = 1. Suppose
that the payoff of effort e1 is valuable for both the worker and the firm, and can
thus be contracted. The payoff of e2 is only valuable for the worker and cannot be
contracted. I will thus refer to e1 later as ”pecuniary effort” and e2 ”non-pecuniary”
effort. Examples of e2 include the worker’s effort to accompany one’s family, exercise
to keep healthy, the worker’s effort to develop a good habit and so on, which is
valuable for the worker herself but has no value to other people, for example, the
employer.
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Assume that the exerted non-pecuniary effort returns a given payoff G > 0 at
t = 2 once the amount of the exerted non-pecuniary effort is higher than a fixed
threshold E. This formulation assumes a fixed cost type of production technology




G, if e2 ≥ E,
0, otherwise.
On the other hand, as e1 is not only valuable to the worker herself but also to
other people, we can imagine that there is a market where pecuniary effort e1 can
be traded competitively. So the payoff function of e1 equals the market price of e1
times the amount of e1 exerted by the worker, that is, e1 returns Γe1 at t = 2 where






e22 + σe1e2 for exerting e1 and e2 with a substitution effect σ ∈ (0, 1)
between the two efforts, which is a simple form of the effort-substitution cost function
introduced by [20].
Suppose that there is no technology for either the worker or the firm to change
the timing of payoff realization. (i.e., there is no bank to borrow from and the firm
has zero budget, so the worker cannot be paid before Γe1 is realized.) The timeline
of the game is shown in Figure 1.1.
As shown in Figure 1.1, a worker can decides whether to sign a hiring contract
to become an employee or keep self-employed at t = 0. After a hiring contract
C = (e1, w) ∈ R+ × R+ is signed at t = 0, the employee must exert the contracted
pecuniary effort e1 at t = 1. The employee can still decide freely the amount of
11
Figure 1.1: Timeline of the interaction between the firm and hired workers
the non-pecuniary effort e2 to exert at t = 1. At t = 2, the non-pecuniary effort e2
generates g(e2) to the employee. Meanwhile, the employer collects the payoff Γe1
generated by e1 and pays the employee a lump-sum wage w ≥ 0 as in the hiring
contract C = (e1, w). If the worker does not sign the contract at t = 0 and remains
self-employed, she chooses both the pecuniary effort e1 and non-pecuniary effort e2
at t = 1 and collects the payoffs Γe1 and g(e2) at t = 2. As a tie-breaking rule,
assume that the worker will choose paid-employment at t = 0 if indifferent between
paid-employment and self-employment. Also, assume that an employee will choose
the contract with higher contracted e1 among contracts yielding the same utility to
her.
Suppose that the worker’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor β is drawn in
a probability distribution function (PDF) f(β) > 0 with [β ∈ β, 1] with a lower
support β ∈ (0, 1). For simplicity, assume that the intertemporal discounting factor
of both the employer and workers equals to one. Also, assuming that the hyperbolic
discounting factor β is a private information of a worker, the employer offers a menu
of contracts, M ⊂ R+×R+, to workers to maximize its profit. Later I will denote a
worker’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting factor β as this worker’s ”type” in this adverse
selection problem. All the proofs for later results can be found in Appendix A.
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1.2.1 Assumptions
All results of the model rely on the following two assumptions.
Assumption 1: Γ > σE.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the productivity of the pecuniary effort e1 is
high enough, so the socially optimal e1 is positive when the worker exerts the mini-
mum e2 to generate the positive non-pecuniary payoff, that is, the socially optimal
e1 satisfies e1 > 0 when e2 = E.








There are two components in Assumption 2, G > Γ
2+E2
2
and G > EΓ
σ
. The
first component guarantees that the non-pecuniary payoff from exerting the non-
pecuniary effort e2 = E is large enough so e2 = E is socially optimal. The second
component G > EΓ
σ
makes sure that a self-employed worker will exert e2 = E, given
that she exerts a strictly positive pecuniary effort e1.
1.3 Player’s Problems
1.3.1 Self-Employed Worker’s Problem
The self-employed worker’s utility at t = 0 is










where e1, e2 is determined by the worker solving her problem at t = 1 as follows,








s.t. e1, e2 ≥ 0.
Taking derivative of V 1(β) with respect to e1 yields e1 = βΓ−σe2 if e1 = βΓ−σe2 ≥
0, otherwise e1 = 0. For e2, there are two potential solutions: e2 = 0 or e2 = E.
If e2 = 0,




If e2 = E,
V 1(β | e2 = E) =

βΓ(βΓ− σE) + βG− 1
2
(βΓ− σE)2 − 1
2











β2Γ2 − βΓσE − 1−σ2
2





E2, if β < σE
Γ
.
The graph of V 1(β | e2 = 0) and V 1(β | e2 = E) for the different choices of e2 is
shown in Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2: Utility of self-employed workers
As in Figure 1.2a, the solid line V 1(β | e2 = E) is composed by firstly a lin-
ear part and then a quadratic part with a threshold at β = σE
Γ




V 1(β | e2 = E) = βG− 12E
2 and when β ≥ σE
Γ
, V 1(β | e2 = E) = 12β
2Γ2 − βΓσE −
1−σ2
2
E2 + βG. The quadratic part of V 1(β | e2 = E) is greater than V 1(β | e2 = 0),
which is the dotted line in Figure 1.2a, once β ≥ (1−σ
2)E2
2(G−σET ) holds.
6 Note that this






2(G−σET ) by Assumption 2. As
a result, e2 = E will be chosen by all self-employed workers with β ≥ σEΓ . On the
other hand, the linear part of V 1(β | e2 = E) is greater than V 1(β | e2 = 0) if β is
greater than a certain threshold β̂. 7 Recall that H is the set of all hired employees.
The above arguments are formalized in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. There exists a threshold β̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that all the self-employed
workers with β > β̂ will exert the efficient non-pecuniary effort which produces
strictly positive non-pecuniary payoff, that is, e2(β) = E, ∀β ∈ [β̂, 1] \H.
By Lemma 1, self-employed workers will choose e2 = E, which is efficient by
Assumption 2, if the worker’s type β is higher than a threshold β̂. Intuitively, if a
worker has a very low quasi-hyperbolic discounting β such that β ≤ β̂, the worker’s
behavior, that is, the trade-off between self-employment and paid-employment, will
be un-robust as the worker does not care much about future payoffs. As the behav-
ior of those workers with extremely low types is not the focus of this chapter and
will bring unnecessary complexity if taken into consideration, I make Assumption 3
below to eliminate this concern.
6This result is derived by solving 12β
2Γ2 − βΓσE − 1−σ
2
2 E
2 + βG ≥ 12β
2Γ2.
7By β̂G − 12E
2 = 12 β̂




G2−E2Γ2 . β̂ ∈ (0, 1) by Assumptions
1-2. In addition, when G increases, this β̂ converges to zero. So the condition β > β̂ is easy to
satisfy with large enough G, which is partially guaranteed by Assumption 2.
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Assumption 3: β > β̂.
With Assumption 3, the efficient e2 = E will be exerted by all self-employed
workers, as their types β are always higher than β and thus higher than β̂. So
with Assumption 3, I can substitute the self-employed workers’ choices of effort,
e1 =

βΓ− σE, if βΓ− σe2 ≥ 0,
0, otherwise
and e2 = E into V
0(β) for the normalized














E2, if β ≤ β < σE
Γ
.
as shown in Figure 1.2b.
Note that in the normalized utility of self-employed workers, I normalize the
workers’ utility and eliminate the worker’s quasi-hyperbolic discounting. By this
normalization, I have different workers’ normalized utility at t = 0 on the same scale
of the employer’s profit and social welfare, eliminating the effect from their quasi-
hyperbolic discounting factors β. This normalized utility can be better illustrated in
graphs to show the relation of a signed contract with social welfare and employer’s
profit, as can be seen later.
1.3.2 Employee’s Problem
The employee’s problem at t = 0 is
















where M is the contract menu chosen by the employer. In the above employee’s
problem, e2 is determined by the employee at t = 1, given the hiring contract
(e1, w) she signed at t = 0. Note that if there are multiple solutions of the above
maximization, the worker will choose the contract with the highest pecuniary effort
by the tie-breaking rule. Denote H =
{







as the set of hired
employees for following analysis.
1.3.3 Employer’s Problem
The employer chooses an optimal menu of contracts M∗ ⊂ R+ ×R+,









s.t. C(β) = {e1(β), w(β)} solves the problem of the employee with type β, ∀β ∈ H,
where H =
{







is the set of employees hired and π(β) =
Γe1(β) − w(β) is an employer’s profit from the employee with type β who signs a
contract C(β) = (e1(β), w(β)).
1.4 Optimal Contract Menu
1.4.1 Employee’s Behavior at t=1
The Revelation Principle implies that the contracting game can be represented
by a direct mechanism where agent’s strategies are reports of types and that, in
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equilibrium, reports are truthful. The problem of an employee with β ∈ H at t = 1
if signing a contract C(β′) = (e1(β
′), w(β′)) can thus be written as







e22 − σe1(β′)e2 + βg(e2).
s.t. e2 ≥ 0.
There are two potential optimal solutions of e2, e2 = 0 or e2 = E which return
utilities as follows.
If e2 = 0,





otherwise if e2 = E,




′) + βG− 1
2
E2 − σEe1(β′). (1.2)
(1.1) ≤ (1.2) if and only if














is a function of contracted e1(β
′) in the
signed contract C(β′). With the decisions for e2 = 0 and e2 = E respectively at
t = 1, the employee’s utility with type β who signs a contract C(β′) at t = 1 is
shown in Figure 1.3a.
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Figure 1.3: Utility of an employee with contract (e1(β
′), w(β′)).
8
In Figure 1.3a, given contracted e1(β
′), at t = 1 the employee will choose e2
20
which yields the higher utility at that moment, which is
e2 =

















































there is a jump on the function of U
0(β,β′)
β
. This can be observed by subtracting the














= G[1− β0(β′)] > 0.
As in Figure 1.3b, given C(β′) contracted, the employee’s normalized utility
U0(β,β′)
β
is neither continuous nor differentiable with respect to β. So the traditional
method to solve the envelope theorem for adverse selection problems by Milgrom
and Segal [23] is not applicable. More importantly, the Spence-Mirrlees condition is
not satisfied for this discontinuous utility function. The failure of Spence-Mirrlees
condition implies that contracts satisfying the local IC conditions for workers and
that the workers will not mimic any neighboring types, does not imply the global
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IC conditions are satisfied [24], that the workers may mimic further-way types. In
this chapter, I employ a different approach by firstly identifying the properties of
the optimal contract menu and then looking for the optimal choice variables of
the employer, as can be seen later. Additionally, for the pooling equilibrium with
limited number of contracts, the discontinuous U
0(β,β′)
β




in the equilibrium, which is one characteristic of the equilibrium.








Figure 1.4: The worker’s utility as an employee or self-employed worker.
Assumption 2 guarantees the jump of U
0(β,β′)
β
at β = β0 to be large enough.






holds for any worker
with β < β0(β
′), given that the C(β′) is a profitable contract for the employer. This
22
is formalized in Lemma 2 below.






will prefer self-employment to any
hiring contract (e1(β
′), w(β′)) profitable to the employer.











, that is, the pecuniary effort
that a worker with type β can accept in a hiring contract in the equilibrium must





. This imposes a constraint of a worker’s ”maximal
contractable effort,” which is linear on the worker’s type β. Also with Lemma 2, as
all the employees are constrainted by their ”maximal contractable effort,” e2 = E
for all employees by (1.3). Combining with Lemma 1, I have Corollary 1 for the
amount of non-pecuniary effort exerted by any worker, no matter whether they are
employed or self-employed.
Corollary 1. All workers, no matter employed or self-employed, will exert
the effective non-pecuniary effort which produces the positive non-pecuniary payoff,
that is, e2 = E, ∀β ∈ [β, 1].
In next Section 5, I will apply the effort choices of the self-employed workers
and hired employees to derive the properties of an optimal contract menu.
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1.4.2 Socially Optimal Pecuniary Effort
In this section, I will solve the socially optimal contract for any worker with
β ∈ [β, 1]. Here, after a given contract signed, a worker will still choose her optimal
non-pecuniary effort e2 freely, but the goal of designing the contract is to maximize
the produced social welfare instead of the employer’s profit. This result will be
helpful in the later discussion about the efficiency of the contract menu in the
equilibrium.
The social welfare produced by a worker with type β, if self-employed, is






e22 − σe1e2 + g(e2).
Note that the worker’s type β is not present in this function of SW (e1, e2).
By Lemma 2, the contract can serve as a commitment device for this worker,





. So with the constraint of ”maximal contractable effort,” I have e2 = E by
(1.3), which can be substituted into the above social welfare function, yielding







Note that this SW (e1) achieves its maximum when e1 = Γ − σE, disregarding
the worker’s constraint of ”maximal contractable effort.” However, as this first-best
pecuniary effort may exceed the worker’s ”maximal contractable effort”, the socially
optimal e∗1 that can be achieved through an employment contract is
e∗1 =





















β for the threshold of the worker’s type to choose between the two possible






= Γ − σE. Hence under
the socially optimal contract, e∗1 for a worker with type β <
ˆ̂






. Otherwise if β ≥ ˆ̂β, the worker will exert e∗ equal to
the first best pecuniary effort Γ− σE.
1.5 Characterization of a Hybrid Equilibrium
In this section, I will solve for the properties of an optimal contract menu in
the model equilibrium.
Proposition 1. There exists an optimal contract menu for the employer.
Proposition 1 directly follows the result of [25]. Based on Proposition 1, a
property of the equilibrium is given in Lemma 3 to further investigate the proper-
ties of the optimal contract menu.













Intuitively, if there is a hired employee with type β′ ∈ H who sign a contract







, workers with slightly lower types will sign the same contract,
which is the only way to satisfy all of those workers’ IC constraints. Lemma 3
formalizes this argument. Lemma 3 implies ranges of quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing factors of employees for a pooling equilibrium, where the lower bound of each
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range must have the constraint of ”maximal contractable effort” for the employee











. Theorem 1 follows Lemma 3, which highlights employees’ behav-
ior in the hybrid equilibrium with pooling and separating parts.
Theorem 1. In the optimal contract menu, there exists a set of disjoint collec-





































The sets of quasi-hyperbolic discounting for pooling equilibrium in Theorem
1, h = ∪jhj, are directly from Lemma 3. Each hj ⊂ h is a connected range of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting factors with workers signing the same contract, with
the constraint of ”maximal contractable effort” binding at its lower bound as stated
in Lemma 3. Note that a hj ⊂ h is closed on its upper bound if it is for the employees
with the highest types, otherwise, hj ⊂ h is open on its upper bound. The remaining
employees sign contracts with pecuniary effort and lump-sum wage differing on their


















types β ∈ H \ h in this separating equilibrium. Each worker in H \ h will exert
her ”maximal contractable effort” and receive a wage which makes her indifferent
between self-employment and paid-employment with this separating contract. Note
that in reality, workers in a certain ”firm position” work similar hours and earn
similar incomes. Hence, one may regard each of the ranges hj ⊂ H for a pooling
equilibrium as the model counterpart of workers in a ”firm position” in reality. In
contrast, the part-time workers in reality are paid based on their working hours and
have more diversified income. The part-time workers in reality thus correspond to
the employees in the separating equilibrium with β ∈ H \h in this model. Note that
it is possible that h = ∅ in the model equilibrium, in which case all the employees
are part-time employees in the separating equilibrium.
Based on Theorem 1, from an employee with type β who signs the contract
C = (e1, w), 11 the employer earns profit
π(β) = Γe1 − w

















Together with Theorem 1, I can write the employer’s profit from an employee with
















G by Lemma 2.
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(Γ− σE)(βΓ− σE)− 1
2
(βΓ− σE)2, if β ≥ σE
Γ
0, otherwise.
Intuitively, Ψ(β) is the social welfare produced by the employee with type β who
exerts her maximal contractable effort and Φ is the employee’s utility from her
outside option, after the same term eliminated. Note that Ψ(β) and Φ(β) are both
quadratic on beta and have the same maximal value (Γ−σE)
2
2
but Ψ(β) takes this







< 1 and Φ(β) takes this maximal value at
the point when β = 1.
Also, with Theorem 1, I can uniquely identify the contract (ej1, w
j) for each
β ∈ hj by the lower and upper bounds of the pooling equilibrium range hj, βj and



































Denote β̃ > 0 for the crossing point of Ψ(β) and Φ(β), that is, Ψ(β̃) = Φ(β̃). Note





, 1) because Ψ(β)− Φ(β) is a quadratic function on β and
Φ
(
















and Φ(1) = (Γ−σE)
2
2
> Ψ(1). Because the employer earns a profit Ψ(β)−Φ(β) from
each part-time workers, it is at least profitable for the employer to hire all the work-
ers with types smaller than β̃, that is, β ∈ [β, β̃]. In addition, it is easy to prove
that the set of hired employees H must be a connected set, with its upper bound
greater or equal to β̃. This argument is formalized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. In the optimal contract menu, a worker will be hired if and
only if her type is lower than a threshold β̄ ∈ [β̃, 1], that is, H = [β, β̄] s.t. β̄ ≥ β̃.
Proposition 2 states that there is a threshold, β̄, for workers to be self-
employed, and all the workers with smaller types will be hired.
With Ψ(β) and Φ(β) defined, the employer’s profit (1.6) from hiring contracts
can be illustrated in Figure 1.5.
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Figure 1.5: Profit of the employer given set of positioned employees h and part-time
employees H \ h
In Figure 1.5, the set of workers’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting for pooling equi-
librium is h = h1 ∪ h2 ∪ h3 ⊂ H. From an employee with β ∈ hj ⊂ H, j ∈ {1, 2, 3},
the employer earns a profit equal to Ψ(β
j
)−Φ(β̄j). So the profits that the employer
earns from employees in a certain firm position hj ⊂ h, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} are shown in
the three rectangle areas in Figure 1.5. From an employee with β ∈ H \ h, the
employer extracts a profit Ψ(β)− Φ(β) so the employer’s profit is the shadow area
between Ψ(β) and Φ(β). The trade-off for the employer between hiring part-time
employees versus positioned employees can also be seen in Figure 1.5: compared with
positioned/pooling employees in hj, the employer pays the part-time/separating em-
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ployees a lower wage which just makes her indifferent between the paid-employment
and self-employment. On the other hand, if the workers have high enough types,




β, the social welfare produced by her as a part-time employee
who exerts her own ”maximal contractable effort” is lower than that from her being
a positioned employee who exerts the ”maximal contractable effort” of the lowest
type worker in the same position. So there is a trade-off for the employer between
hiring full-time employees who exert effort more efficiently but require higher wage
versus hiring part-time employees who exert effort less efficiently but require lower
wage. In this sense, the full-time employment is more profitable for the employer to
impose on the high-type workers, as the benefit from more efficient effort exerting
is higher for high-type workers. Based on this idea, Proposition 3 gives a sufficient
condition, describing the way in which the employees are positioned in an optimal
contract menu.
Proposition 3. In the optimal contract menu, an employee with type β ∈ H
will be in a range for the pooling equilibrium, hj ⊂ h a.e., if Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β) < 0.
That is, ∀β ∈ H such that Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β) < 0, β ∈ hj ⊂ h a.e..
Proposition 3 gives a sufficient condition for an employee with type β ∈ H
in the range of a pooling equilibrium, that is, if β ∈ H and Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β) < 0,
then almost everywhere β ⊂ h. Note the opposite direction does not hold; in other
words, there may exist β ∈ h such that Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β) ≥ 0. Based on Proposition
2, Corollary 2 gives a sufficient condition for the existence of positioned employ-
ment/pooling equilibrium.
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Corollary 2. In an optimal contract menu, h 6= ∅ if H 6= ∅ and Ψ′(β̃) +
Φ′(β̃) < 0.
By Corollary 2, the existence of h can be guaranteed for given ranges of model
parameters, given H 6= ∅. Suppose H 6= ∅. If β̃ < σE
Γ
, Ψ′(β̃) + Φ′(β̃) < 0 always
hold because β̃ >
ˆ̂
β. By Corollary 2, h 6= ∅ if β̃ < σE
Γ
. Otherwise if β̃ ≥ σE
Γ
, the
condition for Corollary 2, Ψ′(β̃) + Φ′(β̃) < 0, is satisfied once G is large enough. 12
So from the above two cases, given H 6= ∅, there is h 6= ∅ if G is large enough, which
is partly guaranteed by Assumption 2. The existence of the pooling equilibrium can
thus be guaranteed by the size of non-pecuniary payoff G.
With Theorem 1 and Propositions 1 to 3, e1(β) and the normalized utility
of all workers in an optimal contract menu is shown in Figure 1.6. Recall that
e2(β) = E, ∀β ∈ [β, 1] by Corollary 1.
12It can be easily solved that Ψ′(β̃) + Φ′(β̃) = Γ2(1− β̃)− β̃σ2E2G
2 + GσE (
E
2σ + Γ− σE) which is
negative with G large enough.
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Figure 1.6: Separation of different jobs in the optimal contract menu
In Figure 1.6, all the workers with β ∈ [β, β̄) are hired employees where there
are three positions h1 ∪ h2 ∪ h3 = h for those in the pooling equilibrium. At the
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lower bound of each position where β = β
j
, ∀j = {1, 2, 3}, e1(β) is continuous as
shown in Figure 1.6a while U
0(β)
β
is discontinuous as shown in Figure 1.6b. This
discontinuity of e1(β) is because at β = βj, the constraint of ”maximal contractable
effort” prevents the employee with types slightly lower than β
j
from mimicking
higher type employee who earns a higher wage. The discontinuity in utilities can
thus sustain.
On the other hand, at the upper bound β = β̄j, e1(β) is discontinuous as
shown in Figure 1.6a while U
0(β)
β




is because the employees at the different sides of β = β̄j can
mimic each other freely with their constraint of ”maximal contractable effort” slack,
U0(β)
β
must be continuous. Meanwhile, because U
0(β)
β
is continuous at this point but
self-employed workers with types slightly higher than supH work significantly less
than employees, reflected in the discontinuous e1(β), those self-employed workers
must earn a significantly lower monetary payoff than the employees with slightly
lower types. This observation could explain the observation that people enter into
self-employment despite the lower income of self-employed workers than employees.
This explanation is consistent with Hurst and Pugsley [10]’s suggestion for the non-
monetary benefit of self-employment, that is, ”more flexibility” or ”being one’s own
boss,” which is consistent with the lower pecuniary effort exerted by self-employed
workers in the model equilibrium.
Finally, as there is a β′ ∈ h2 ⊂ H such that Ψ′(β′) + Φ(β′) < 0 and β′ > σEG
in Figure 1.6, by Proposition 3 all the employees with β > β′ will be positioned
employees in the pooling equilibrium. As a result, there should be no gap between
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the positions h2 and h3, that is, β̄2 = β3.
1.6 Implications
In this section, I derive properties of the hybrid equilibrium for the model which
spells out the firm hierarchy and labor market structure with part-time workers and
positions of full-time workers, independent of the distribution of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting factor β of workers and based on general assumptions of the model
parameters. I will make more assumptions to simplify the solution further, with
which I can discuss some policy implication of the model.
1.6.1 First Order Condition







So for given e11, β1 > β and β1 ≤ β1 are both possible. With the properties of
the hybrid equilibrium given above, there are two possible forms for the employer’s





> β, the most procrastinating workers with lowest types sign separating























≥ β̄i, ∀hi, hi+1 ⊂ h. (1.7)
If β
1
≤ β, the most procrastinating workers with lowest types are in the pooling
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equilibrium h1 and the first term in (1.6.1) for the profit from part-time employees
in [β, β
1


















≥ β̄i, ∀hi, hi+1 ⊂ h. (1.8)




π(β)f(β)dβ if the number




For the above two profit functions, the FOCs for β
j
and β̄j are the same. The
FOC for β̄1 are the same too. However, the FOCs for β1 are different, that is,
Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1) + Ψ
′(β
1









≤ β. The optimal solution for of the model can thus only be identified after
comparing potential solutions of the two sets of FOCs if no further assumption is
made. This will make the solution difficult to tract. Because of this, I will make
Assumption 4 to further simplify the model.
Assumption 4. β <
ˆ̂
β and G > Ĝ. 13
Assumption 4 makes sure that the maximal contractable effort of the lowest
type worker, that is, β = β, is smaller than the socially optimal pecuniary effort




which makes sure that (β̂,
ˆ̂
β) 6= ∅ for β be able to satisfy both
Assumption 3 and β > β̂.
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Γ − σE. With Assumption 4, it is optimal for the employer to assign the lowest
type employee with β = β a contract with her ”maximal contractable effort”. The
lowest type worker at β = β is thus in the separating equilibrium. This argument
is formalized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. In the optimal contract menu, with Assumptions 1-4, the




By Proposition 4, the FOC of the employer’s problem for β
1
is unique so that
I can track the solution of optimal contract menu using the unique set of FOCs on
the employer’s choice variables. Recall that I denote the socially optimal pecuniary
effort that can be achieved in hiring contracts as e∗1, which satisfies e
∗
1 ≤ Γ − σE.
Corollary 3 directly follows the FOC of β
1
.
Corollary 3. With Assumptions 1-4, all the positioned employees exert pecu-
niary effort more than socially optimal level, that is, e1(β) > Γ− σE ≥ e∗1, ∀β ∈ h.
By Corollary 3, all the positioned workers overwork. Note that by paying a
lower wage, the employer tends to earn a higher profit from part-time employees
than from positioned ones. As a result, the employer has the motive to require an
effort higher than socially optimal for positioned employees as in Corollary 3, in















The solution for the optimal contract menu, as one can easily see, depends on
the distribution of β. In order to further discuss the implications of the model, I
identify the equilibrium by assuming a simple distribution of β, that is, a uniform
distribution. In addition, to avoid the complexity from the kink on Φ(β) for the
FOCs of the employer at β = σE
Γ











< 1, Assumption 5 requires the size of pecuniary pay-






, so Assumption 5 makes
sure that β
1
is at the concave rather than linear part of Φ(β). Based on Assumption
5 and uniform distribution of β, I have Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. In the optimal contract menu, with Assumptions 1-5, if
the distribution of β is uniform, an employee with β ∈ H must sign the same
hiring contract if and only if her type β is higher than a threshold β
1
≤ β̃, that is,
h = h1 = [β1, β̄) where β̄ ∈ [β̃, 1].
By Proposition 5, if the distribution of β is uniform and Assumptions 1-5 hold,
there is only one position, h1 = h, for employees with comparatively higher types.
With Assumptions 1-5 and uniform distribution of β, in the equilibrium workers
are partitioned into three sets by their types: lowest-type workers with β such that
β ≤ β < β
1
are part-time employees in the separating equilibrium, medium-type
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workers with β such that β
1
≤ β < β̄1 are positioned employees in the pooling equi-
librium and the highest-type workers with β > β̄1 are self-employed. By theorem
1, only the positioned employees with medium types benefit from the hiring contract.
With Proposition 5, there are only two choice variables for the employer to
decide, the lower bound of types for full-time workers β
1
which determines the







and the upper bound of























The policy implications of the model are derived based the above profit function of
the employer.
1.6.3 Policy Implications
In this section, I will discuss the marginal effect of ceilings on working hours
and wage in the equilibrium. Specifically, I will calculate the marginal effect of de-
creasing the ceiling which was binding at the equilibrium level without the ceiling.
By doing this, I can show the direction of the marginal impact from those regu-




By Corollary 3, all workers in h ⊂ H work more than the socially optimal level.
One natural question is that whether the government can improve the social wel-
fare by imposing a regulation for the maximum allowed working hours, ê1, in hiring
contracts. With Assumptions 1-5, the model gives an affirmative answer to this
question. Even more, the model predicts the workers’ surplus also rises from a









, with a binding ceiling of working hours ê1, the threshold
of workers’ types for positioned jobs β
1
decreases and workers with lower types can
benefit from the positioned job. On the other hand, the working hour regulation
will affect the threshold of self-employment β̄1 through its impact on β1. Applying








2Φ′(β̄1) + Φ′′(β̄1)(β̄1 − β1)
which can be proved to be strictly negative, when the wage hours ceiling ê1 just
binds at the maximal equilibrium working hours for employees, e11, without the ceil-
ing. Intuitively, the lower working hours makes it cheaper for the employer to hire
high-type workers, so more high-type workers will be hired by the employer once the
working hours ceiling is imposed. A slightly lower binding ceiling on working hours
will thus decrease β
1
and increase β̄1. This is good news as the total employment
and the full-time employment both increase marginally. The more full-time employ-
ment means that more workers can enjoy the surplus from full-time employment and
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their surplus increases. Also, the pecuniary effort exerted by the employed workers
increases and gets closer to the socially optimal level, and social surplus produced
by each employee increases. Together with the higher total employment, the total
social welfare must increase. As the marginal effect of wage hours ceiling at the
equilibrium maximal wage of employees is beneficial for both the social welfare and
workers, a properly designed working hours ceiling will increase both the workers’
surplus and social welfare.
Wage ceiling
A wage ceiling is a restriction on the highest wage that an employer can pay to the
employees. As the wage ceiling will affect the employer’s choice of contract menus,
it will affect the workers’ choice and further the workers’ surplus and social welfare.
However, the model cannot give a clear implication for the change in the social
welfare when a wage ceiling is imposed. The reason is given as follows.
Note that with the uniform distribution of β, w11 for employees in h1 is the
highest wage that can be earned by employees by Proposition 5. When a wage
ceiling ŵ lower than the equilibrium w11 is imposed, I have






































With the FOC of the employer’s problem with respect to β
1
, I can apply the
rule for implicit function theorem on (1.9) for β
1
with respect to ŵ. However, the




> 0 is ambiguous. Also, as the β
1
and ŵ will both affect
41
β̄1, with ambiguous change of β1, the change in β̄1 with the binding working hours
ceiling imposed is ambiguous too. It is thus unclear how the equilibrium changes
with a wage ceiling imposed.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Self-Employment
The model is related to the literature of self-employment where a lower in-
come with higher variance is observed for self-employed workers than for employees
([17]; [11] etc.). This observation cannot be well explained by the existing theo-
retical literature about self-employment, including the investment and agent model
[26] where the self-employment and paid-employment jobs have different earning
profiles; matching and learning [27] that the workers have different unknown skills
for different sectors that need to be figured out after entering into that sector; and
”overconfidence” [28] that entrepreneurs tend to overestimate their success.
As referred to above, this chapter builds a theoretical model consistent with
[10] who suggest the importance of non-monetary benefits such as ”more flexibility”
and ”being one’s own boss” in choosing self-employment: the higher equilibrium
utility of the self-employed workers in this model results from the lower pecuniary
effort, that is, the non-monetary benefit, instead of a higher payoff earned. The
lower income of self-employment can thus be explained.
In addition, the model can explain the low income of self-employment and its
high variance through a second channel. Note that although this model predicts that
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only the least procrastinating workers will be self-employed, the implicit definition of
self-employment in this chapter is different from that in other works. In this chapter,
self-employment is the status of the workers without a pecuniary effort committed
in the hiring contract, which is closer to the law definition of ”self-employment,”
where self-employment and paid-employment are identified by whether there is a
contract ”for” services or contract ”of” services [11]. However, as the self-employed
status is often ”self-assessed” in other researches, many workers classified as part-
time employees in this chapter could be classified as self-employed workers in those
other studies, probably in the form of ”freelancers” or independent contractors. 14
As the part-time and self-employed workers are those with extreme types who earn
very different incomes in this model, the model predicts that the data with those
two types of workers pooling may have lower average income and a higher income
variance compared with the income of remaining workers.
This argument is also consistent with the findings of Levine and Rubinstein
[17], where the authors suggest using incorporated business owners and unincor-
porated business owners to identify two different types of self-employed workers.
Levine and Rubinstein [17] show that, compared with employees, the incorporated
business owners have higher income while the unincorporated business owners have
lower income. This diversification of ”self-employed” workers is consistent with the
diversification between the workers defined as self-employed workers and part-time
employees in this model.
14See [11] for the discussion of the definition of self-employment in the literature.
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1.7.2 Competitive Labor Market
The previous results of the model are all based on a monopsonist firm offering
the hiring contracts as commitment devices, where the firm can exploit all the
surplus from the employees in the separating equilibrium. In the labor market with
competitive firms, the equilibrium will be different.
Consider the firms that compete perfectly to offer the commitment devices. In
this case, firms will earn zero profit through competition while employees get all the
surplus by receiving w(e1) = Γe1. The socially optimal pecuniary effort that can
be achieved in a hiring contract will be contracted, for all workers in [β, 1]. Among
the employees, those with β ∈ [β, ˆ̂β) will be in the separating equilibrium signing





, which is their maximal contractable effort but
still smaller than the socially optimal level. Those employees with β ∈ [ ˆ̂β, 1] will
sign the same contract with socially optimal e1 = Γ− σE in a pooling equilibrium.
The social optimum as discussed in Section 1.4.2 can thus be achieved by perfect
competition.
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter investigates an adverse selection problem where a monopsonist
firm offers hiring contracts as commitment devices to sophisticated workers with
different procrastination. Those sophisticated workers, when choosing the hiring
contracts as commitment devices, face a trade-off between contractable and uncon-
tractable efforts. I further discuss the model’s implication for the firm structure,
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labor market structure and public policies regarding ceilings of working hours. The
model explains the separation of self-employment and paid-employment in the labor
market, as well as the position hierarchy within the firm among employees due to
their procrastination. The prediction of the model is consistent with the empirical
observation in the literature about the wage penalty of part-time workers and the
lower income of self-employment. It can also help explain the popularity of low-
powered incentives in workplaces. Finally, in a market with firms that compete
perfectly to offer the commitment devices, the most efficient hiring contracts will be
offered. In the uniform case, the model predicts that a properly designed ceiling on
working hours can increase both the social welfare and workers’ surplus, while the
effect of wage ceiling is ambiguous in this model.
Based on this chapter, further investigations can be made to explore the em-
ployment market with procrastinating workers. As mentioned in this chapter, the
final structure of equilibrium and firm positions depend on the distribution of work-
ers’ quasi-hyperbolic discounting. It would be an interesting question to characterize
the equilibrium with different distribution of workers’ types. Besides, in this model,
as the market structure depends on the model parameters including the productiv-
ity of pecuniary/non-pecuniary effort, it can offer a new channel for economy cycles
which affects workers’ productivity, to affect the full-time and part-time employ-
ment. Finally, in this model, all workers are assumed to have the same productivity.
Introducing the heterogeneity in workers’ productivity can bring an extra dimension
into the market, which can explain more practical problems.
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Chapter 2: Role of Leaders with Different Genders in Group All-Pay
Auctions
Introduction
This chapter studies how behavior in a group all-pay auction is affected when
there is a ”reward” stage to reward bidders for their winning bids. This game analo-
gizes real competitions such as awarding of monopoly licenses, political campaigns,
research/development races, and wars where members make a contribution to their
groups, and once the contribution is made, members’ contributions cannot be re-
turned, no matter win or lose. Previous research shows that there is usually no pure
strategy equilibrium in full-information all-pay auctions without the reward stage
(see the literature review in [29]). Note that in real competitions, a discretionary
reward is common after group competitions; for example, a promotion or a bonus,
occurs according to members’ performance in the group. In this chapter, we thus
introduce a leader of the group who can allocate the prize among the members as
rewards after the competition. We show that with this leader who can reward a
pure strategy equilibrium does exist in the group all-pay auction. We also predict
the pattern of members and leaders’ behavior in the equilibrium and run a pilot
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experiment to test for those predictions.
In the equilibrium, we show that leaders’ reward to a specific member increases
on this members’ bid and decreases on other members’ bid in the same group. In-
tuitively, given members’ bids, leaders with higher reciprocity reward more. Also,
when the members are told of their leaders’ genders, the model predicts that mem-
bers should bid more when assigned to leaders with the more reciprocal gender.
This prediction contributes to the management literature for comparison between
female and male leaders in business. [30]
In this chapter, members and leaders interact in a two-stage group all-pay
auction where each group consists of three members and one leader. In the first
stage, two groups compete in a group all-pay auction with full information for a given
prize. Each member bids from one’s initial endowment and the group bid is the sum
of its members’ bids. The group wins the competition for sure if its group bidding
is strictly higher. At a tie, each group wins the competition with 50% probability.
The members are told of their leader’s gender when they bid. In the second stage,
leaders of those groups allocate the prize, if any, among the group. In the model,
we assume that leaders are reciprocal and thus reward those members to maximize
their reciprocity utility function (see [31] for the relevant literature). Specifically, as
those members who bid higher are perceived by the leaders as ’kinder’, the leader
will prefer to allocate them a higher amount of reward. A pilot lab experiment is run
in order to test the predictions of the model and the initial findings are consistent
with the theoretical predictions.
In Section 2.1, we introduce the model for reciprocal leaders in the two stage
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all-pay auction where the leaders can reward members after the auction. Section 2.2
gives the predictions of the model. Section 2.3 presents the experimental procedure
and observations of a pilot study. Other theories that can be relevant for explaining
subjects’ behavior are discussed in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.1 Model Setting
In this section, we introduce the setup for the specific parameters of the model.
Note that the parameters such as the prize and initial endowments can be generalized
easily. Suppose that there are two leaders, L ∈ {1, 2}. Each leader L is assigned
to a group with three members, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Members are given 360 points as
an initial endowment, from which they can bid for their group. The Members
in a group and across groups make simultaneous bids in an all-pay auction setting.
Leaders are given 180 points as the initial endowment, but they can not do anything
on the first bidding stage. The group with the higher sum of bids by members
win a prize of 2400 points. If the group wins, the leader may allocate member j
with rj ≥ 0 points after observing the member’s bid bj from the winning prize of
2400 points, where
∑3
j=1 rj ≤ 2400. After the experiment, the leader’s payoff is
πL = 180 + 2400−
∑3
j=1 rj, and the member j’s payoff is πj = 360− bj + rj.
With the standard selfish utility for leaders, leaders in the equilibrium will
never reward anything to members even if the group wins. we conjecture that
bidders who believe that the leaders are reciprocal will not follow this equilibrium
suggested by the standard selfish model.
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To explain the behavior of reward by leaders and the members’ positive bids,
we model the leaders’ objectives by incorporating their reciprocity motivation. We
can show that such a reciprocity model (see the literature review by [31]) can ex-
plain the leaders’ rewarding decisions and the correlations between the reward and
members’ bids.
If the group wins, the optimization problem of a reciprocal leader L on the








rj ≥ 0, for any j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where
k(rj, bj) = uM(πj(bj, ri))− uM .
k(rj, bj) is the leader’s reciprocal ’kindness’, measured as the difference between a
member’s utility, uM(πj), and a certain threshold uM . uM is a member’s utility
when the leader is neutral and does not behave kindly or unkindly to the member.
k(rj, bj) is multiplied by the member’s bid bj in the leader’s objective function,
implying that it is more beneficial for the leader to be kind to a member who bid
higher. uL(πL) is the leader’s utility from his/her monetary payoff πL. Both uM(π)
and uL(π) are monotone and strictly concave with respect to the received monetary
payoff π.
1Note that we do not consider the upper bound for the leaders’ reward
∑3
j=1 rj ≤ 2400 as we
expect that few of the leaders in reality will reach this upper bound and left zero rewards for the
leader-self. In the pilot experiment, none of the leaders reached this upper bound.
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2.2 Model Predictions
By comparing the first order condition (FOC) of problem 2.1 with respect to
the reward rj for different members j in the same group, we have the following
comparison between the net earnings of different members of a group. Proofs for all
theoretical results in this chapter can be found in Appendix B.
Proposition 1. Among members of a winning group who bid positive amounts and
received positive rewards, a bidder with higher bid gets a higher net payoff after the
leader’s reward, that is, for members j, k in the same winning group, if bj > bk > 0
and rj, rk > 0, then πj > πk.
Proposition 1 gives a critical prediction by the reciprocity model: in the same
winning group, bids and net payoffs of members, once members received a positive
reward, should end up with the same orders. It is a strong result because after the
first stage before the leader rewarded the members, higher bidders should have fewer
remaining points, and the ranks of bids and members’ payoffs should be ordered in
opposite ways. According to Proposition 1, the leader’s reward should be large
enough to reverse the ranks of payoffs among members, making the highest(lowest)
bidder end up with the highest (lowest) payoff.
Proposition 1 is about the comparison of members’ bids and their payoffs in
the same group, while Proposition 2 below addresses the mere effect of a member’s
bid on his/her payoff, given bids of other members in the same group.
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> 0 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3} if the group wins.
Proposition 2 predicts how a member’s reward relates to the member’s own
bid if the group wins. Note that it is not a corollary of Proposition 1. Proposition 1
addresses the relative orders of net payoffs and bids in a certain group, while Propo-
sition 2 is about the absolute change in members’ reward on their bids. Proposition
3 below further addresses how the member’s reward relates to other members’ bids
in the same group.
Proposition 3. Member j’s reward decreases with other members’ bids in the
same group if the group wins, that is,
∂rj(b1,b2,b3,γ)
∂bi
< 0 for members i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and i 6= j in a winning group.
As Proposition 2 states a positive correlation between the leader’s reward to a
particular member and this member’s bid in winning groups, Proposition 3 suggests
a negative correlation between the reward to a particular member and the bids of
other members in the same group. Combining Propositions 2 and 3, we know that a
leader’s reward to a specific member increases with this member’s bid and decreases
with other members’ bid. As a result, reciprocal leaders apply a ”tournament-type”
rewarding scheme in each group, which, as proven in [32], can effectively motivate
their members in the environment with common shocks in members’ performance.
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In other words, reciprocal leaders’ strategy adapts to this environment even when
they are the last movers of the game.
Proposition 4. Given bids submitted by a winning group, a leader with a higher




Proposition 4 illustrates how the leaders’ reward changes with the leaders’
levels of reciprocity. Given the bids of members, it is intuitive that a more reciprocal
leader rewards more than the less reciprocal one. We can test whether there is a
significant difference in the reward by leaders with different genders and identify
which gender of leaders is more reciprocal based on Proposition 4.
In this model, members are the first movers of the game. So even if they
are reciprocal, the motive of reciprocity does not play any role in the members’
utility function as they do not perceive any kindness from either the leaders or other
members before they bid. We will thus model members as classical selfish subjects
who only care about their own monetary payoffs and identify an equilibrium for
members’ bids by solving the members’ problem on the first stage of the game, given
their belief for leaders’ reciprocal level. One observable factor which may relate to
the agents’ reciprocity level is the leader’s gender. Previous literature ([33], [34] etc.)
suggests a higher reciprocity level of female subjects compared with male subjects.
In the pilot experiments, I informed bidders of the gender of their leader to test for
the predictions of the model, given heterogeneity in reciprocal types of leaders with
different genders.
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By doing this, we can further look for evidence in members’ bids to verify
the belief held by members for leaders’ reciprocity level. In the following analysis,
denote leader’s gender as G ∈ {G1, G2}. Note that the theory only assumes that
there are two reciprocal types, I interpret it as gender as my pilot experiments test
for heterogeneity of reciprocity by leaders with different genders. however, results
can be applied for types due to some other observable differences between leaders.
In the pilot experiment, the bidders know their own leader’s gender, but not the
gender of the competing team’s leader. Hence members need to form a belief to
guess the equilibrium bids of the competing team, which depends on the leader’s
gender in this competing team. Assume that Pi ratio of leaders in the population
have gender G = Gi for i ∈ {1, 2}, such that P1 + P2 = 1. Denote the mem-
ber j’s bid when assigned to a leader with gender Gi as b
i
j. The member’s belief for
a leader with gender Gi to have a reciprocity coefficient γ can be denoted as f(γ|Gi).
Definition 1. Members believe that leaders with gender G1 are more reciprocal
than leaders with gender G2 if f(γ|G1) first order stochastic dominates (FOSD)
f(γ|G2).
Given members’ belief for the more reciprocal gender of leaders, we can model
members’ choices of bids in a payoff-maximizing problem and study the properties
of the equilibrium bidding behavior of the members.
To be able to solve the bidding behavior of the members, we will study mem-
bers with utility functions of constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), that is,
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uM(π) = 1 − e−Rπ. We also need a technical assumption that restricts the risk
aversion parameter of the members. Precisely, we need to assume that there exists
a cutoff R′ > 0 such that a member’s risk aversion parameter, R, cannot exceed
this cutoff. 2 These two assumptions are not needed for Propositions 1-4, and those
properties of leaders’ reward in Propositions 1-4 hold with any strictly concave util-
ity function of members and leaders.
Proposition 5. If members believe that leaders with gender G1 are more recipro-
cal than leaders with gender G2, there exists an equilibrium where members bid a
higher bid with leaders of gender G1 than G2, i.e. b
1
j = b
1 ≥ b2j = b2 for any member
j.
Proposition 5 guarantees the existence of an equilibrium with b1j = b
1 ≥ b2j = b2
for any member j if members believe that leaders with gender G1 are more reciprocal
than those with gender G2. The result stated in Proposition 5 can be tested by our
initial experiments, to see whether there is difference of reciprocity of leaders with
different gender, and whether this gender-dependent reciprocity can be predicted by
the members.










We ran some pilot laboratory experiments for a simple test of the above pre-
dictions.
We recruited 31 male leaders, 29 female leaders, and 174 members. Every three
members were randomly assigned to one group. Each of the leaders was shown four
different groups and each group of members was shown to four different leaders.
Hence we needed (29 + 31) ∗ 3 = 180 members to make up those groups. In the
experiment, we reused the bid of six of the recruited members to make up the 60
groups of three members.
The experiment was conducted using experimental ”points.” In the group all-
pay auction, every two groups were paired to compete for a prize of 2400 points. The
exchange rate between one RMB (Chinese Yuan) and one experimental point was 1
RMB to 30 experimental points. At the beginning of the game, members were given
360 points for their initial endowment and leaders were given 180 points for their
initial endowment. 3 Members were told of their leader’s gender, and they could
bid integer points from their endowments for their group. Members paid their bid
no matter whether their group won or lost. Members only bid once, while leaders
rewarded members using the strategy method: after groups were paired and the
results of competitions decided, each leader was shown all individual members’ bids
and the competition results of the four groups assigned. For each winning group
3On average, each subject earned average 15 RMB payoff plus 5 RMB show-up fee, which was
equivalent to about 3.2 USD. The hourly wage for a student worker in the campus was 15 RMB
per hour or about 2.4 USD.
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within these four groups, the leader decided how to allocate the 2400 point prize
among the leader and three members. The leader could not reward anything to a
losing group. In other words, each leader saw the contribution of 3 ∗ 4 members,
and decided the reward if the group won. After leaders made the point reward
decisions, the experimenter randomly pick one group (out of four) for each leader,
and calculated the leader’s and the members’ payment based on the leader’s decisions
made for that group.
The experiments were run using printed instructions and experimental forms.
All members and leaders had to complete some questions to test their understanding
of the rules. The understanding test for the later session was harder than that for
the first session to be sure of the subjects’ understanding of the experiment. There
was no significant difference in the behavior of subjects who passed the harder
understanding test or easier understanding test. In future experiments, a single
understanding test should be given to all subjects.
After the understanding test, the competition stage was run where all mem-
bers wrote down their bids on their experimental forms with the gender of their
leaders written on top. The experimenter then collected all the forms, assigned
members into groups randomly, calculated the sum of bids in each group, and got
the competition results for randomly paired groups. In the following reward stage,
the leaders received experimental forms which showed the individual bids of mem-
bers and competition results in four groups, and made their decisions.
In the experiment, leaders were told of the members’ genders in the first smaller
session. This extra information was eliminated in the later session, as leaders did
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not seem to respond to this information. Though there is no significant difference
in the subjects’ behavior when this information is given or not, the model setting
should be consistent in future experiments, i.e. all leaders are not told of their
members’ genders. In both sessions, the leaders wrote down their reward to each
of those members on their experimental forms. 4 Although all the members’ bids
were shown to leaders, those who did not pass the understanding test questions only
received their show-up fee. Their bids would not be used in the analysis for members’
bid. Leaders also had to pass the understanding test to get paid in addition to the
show-up fee and have their data used in the analysis.
A considerable number of leaders passed the understanding test: 20 out of 29
female leaders and 24 out of 31 male leaders passed the test. As we showed each
leader four groups, leaders made reward decisions in groups for 44× 4 = 176 times,
coming from 44 groups of members. 90 of those groups won and 86 lost. 5 Those
leaders thus made 3 = 270 decisions of reward for each member in the winning
groups, which was later used to analyze the leaders’ strategy of reward. Among the
174 members recruited, 122 of them passed all questions in the understanding tests
and will be used to investigate whether members bid differently according to the
genders of their leaders.
One experimental session was run in Shenzhen University. To get more data,
another session was run in Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University. The locations
of experiments were changed because one of the experimenters changed locations.
4If the group lost in a reward treatment, the leader still saw the bids and competition result,
that is, losing, but did not have any prize to share.
5The number for winning and losing groups are not equal as some groups are dropped in this
data as their leaders did not pass the understanding tests.
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Note that both the schools are mid-rank public universities in cities of China and
they both admit undergraduate students from all over the country where the stu-
dents are screened by standard university entrance exams. Due to the similarity
of the two schools, there is no reason to believe that the pool of students changed
significantly in different sessions. As anticipated, the rewarding behavior of leaders
and bids of members were quantitatively the same between those two sessions. For
further experiments, subjects should be recruited from the same school to avoid
possible confounds. In both sessions, the instructions for all treatments were read
aloud. The total time for these experiments was 20 minutes. A show-up fee of 5CNY
was paid to each subject in addition to their earnings in the session in which they
participated.
2.4 Results
With experimental data collected in the pilot study, we are able to check
whether the predictions by the reciprocity model were consistent with our observa-
tions. When calculating p-values for the leaders’ reward, one problem is that we get
multiple and potentially dependent observations from the multiple groups assigned
to one leader. To control for the dependency among those observations, I use a
cluster regression, using the leaders’ ID as the cluster variable. Note that due to
the complex form of the possible dependency of observations by the same leader
within and among the groups, a cluster regression may not be able to capture all
the effect. In future experiments, a leader should only be assigned to one single
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group, to avoid the interference between observations in different groups rewarded
by the same leader.
Observation 1.
Recall that Proposition 1 suggests that the members’ net payoff and their bids
should be correlated positively in winning groups. In the data, leaders who passed
the understanding test questions made 270 decisions of reward to members in 90
winning groups. In 89 out of those 90 groups, leaders rewarded non-zero points to
all three members. 6 Among the 89 groups where members received the non-zero
reward, 48 groups had members’ payoffs in the same order as their bids, that is,
53.9% of the winning groups are consistent with the prediction of Proposition 1. On
the other hand, there are only six groups where members bid differently but ended
up with the same payoff, 7 and three groups where the payoff of members in the
same group had the opposite order as the bids of those members; in other words,
the highest (lowest) bidder received the lowest (highest) payoff.
Observation 2.
Proposition 2 predicts how a bidder’s reward depends on her own bid for given bids
of other members, which is tested in Observation 2.
The top 25 percentile of bids received by leaders was 300 points or more. Lead-
ers rewarded members who bid more than 300 points with 608.91 points on average.
The bottom 25 percentile of bids received by leaders was 200 or fewer points. Lead-
6The three members in the remaining one group were all allocated with zero rewards.
7If we relax the equality condition and allow variance in members’ payoffs, i.e. groups where
members bid differently but the difference in their final net payoffs is smaller than 30 points, there
are still only seven groups that falls into this category.
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ers rewarded members who bid less than 200 points with 455.98 points on average.
The difference in leaders’ reward to the top 25 percentile and bottom 25 percentile
bidders is significant with a p-value of 0.00 by both t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Also, the Pearson pairwise correlation between the reward for members and
the members’ own bids is 0.3293 with a p-value of 0.00. Those results above are
consistent with the prediction of Proposition 2.
Observation 3.
Proposition 3 predicts that members’ reward should decrease on bids by other mem-
bers in the same group.
Leaders who received at least one bid among the top 25 percentile of bids,
as discussed in Observation 2, rewarded another member in the group with 503.97
points on average. Leaders who received at least one bid from the bottom 25 per-
centile bids rewarded another member in the group with 572.12 points on aver-
age. This difference in rewards is significant with p-value 0.00 by both t-test and
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Also, the Pearson pairwise correlation between the re-
ward for a particular member and the bid of a different member in the same group
is −0.14 with p-value 0.00. Those results above are consistent with the prediction
of Proposition 3.
Observation 4.
Proposition 4 proposes that the more reciprocal leaders should reward more, given
the members’ bids.
In the experiment, female leaders rewarded 584.63 points on average while male
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leaders rewarded 506.87 points on average. The difference in rewards is significant
with both t-test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with p-value 0.01. However, one
may argue that this difference in rewards can be caused by the different levels of
bids from members facing leaders with different genders. Hence, we use a clustered
linear regression to compare the reward level of female and male leaders. As each
leader makes decisions of reward to members in four groups, we use leaders’ ID as
the cluster variable to control for the correlation between the rewards made by the
same leader. The regression result is shown in following Table 2.1.
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Variables (1) (2)










Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.1: Regression of Reward on leader’s Gender and Bids
In both regressions of Table 2.1, the coefficient of the gender dummy (Male=1,
Female=0) is negative and significant at 0.10 with a p-value of 0.073 and 0.060
respectively, implying that male leaders on average allocated a lower amount of
reward than female leaders. A problem of this above regression is that the leaders
are shown four groups at the same time and there may exist interactions between
bids by those groups in the leader’s reward. We are unable to eliminate this by
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introducing the group fix effects, as the variable of the leader’s gender will be a
linear combination of those group fix effects. In the future experiments, each leader
should only be assigned to one group and reward members in this assigned group in
a decision method, to avoid this issue.
Observation 5.
As female leaders are more reciprocal than male leaders as suggested by Observation
4, Observation 5 shows that members anticipated that female leaders are more
reciprocal as follows.
On average, female leaders received 242.16 points of bids while male leaders
received 217.33 points of bids on the competition stage. This difference is significant
by t-test at a significance level of 0.10 (p-value, 0.083). Also, for both female and
male members, they bid qualitatively higher when assigned to female leaders than
male leaders although the difference is not significant.
The distribution of members’ bid to leaders with different genders can be seen
in following Figure 2.2.
63
Figure 2.1: Histogram of Bids to Female and Male Leaders
The first and second histograms in Figure 2.2 are the probability distributions
of bids to female and male leaders respectively. The two histograms are similar
with a peak of bids at 200 points with a probability of 30%. One may notice that
there are more members who bid 0 to male leaders than female leaders. Also, there
are more members who bid the highest 360 points to female leaders than to male
leaders. This difference in the extreme amount of bids led to the final difference in
the average amount of bids to male and female leaders.
Observation 6.
Members bid higher to female leaders so that female leaders won often as reported
in Observation 5. Meanwhile, female leaders rewarded more than male leaders
if they won as reported in Observation 4. So a natural question to ask whether
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female leaders do end up with higher net payoffs after the experiments, i.e. whether
female leaders’ more reciprocal strategies pays off with higher monetary payoffs in
this experiment. Pooling winning and losing groups together, female leaders earn
540.73 points of net payoffs while male leaders earn 423.38 points of net payoffs
after the experiment. 8 The difference is significant by t-test with p-value 0.02
and Kolmogorove-Smirnov test with p-value 0.01. As a result, female leaders get
a higher average net payoff than male leaders in this experiment. In other words,
female leaders’ strategy of higher reward/reciprocity pays off in this environment.
2.5 Discussion
In this chapter, we use the reciprocity model to explain the leaders’ positive re-
ward to the winning group members. Note that leaders’ reward cannot be explained
by the standard selfish utility model where subjects are assumed to only care about
their monetary payoffs. As the leaders are the last movers in a one-shot sequential
move game, the standard economic theory would predict that leaders never reward
members, and they keep all the points that their groups win to themselves. Other
than the reciprocity model, the inequity aversion model seems like a natural alterna-
tive behavioral model to explain any positive reward by the leaders. However, one
may incorporate an inequity aversion model (see [31] for relevant literature) in our
setup and show that some of our experimental findings would be inconsistent with
the predictions of such a model. For example, the experimental data shows that the
8Here, we calculate the leaders’ payoffs based on all the four groups they are matched with,
i.e., we include the four counterfactual payoffs for each leader in this analysis.
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ranks of payoffs are the same as the bids’ ordering in more than half of the groups
after the leaders’ reward, that is, the highest (lowest) bidder ends with the highest
(lowest) payoff after rewarding, as discussed in Observation 1. This observation
cannot be explained by the inequity aversion model since an inequity-averse leader
would prefer a smaller gap of payoffs within the group but never sacrifice his/her
payoff to make the ranks of members’ payoffs same as the ordering of bids.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we derive a pure strategy equilibrium for a first-prize all-pay
auction with complete information where reciprocal leaders can allocate the prize
based on the members’ bids in winning groups.
The result predicts that the leaders’ reward will make the members in a group
end up with the same orders of net payoffs and bids. Also, a member’s reward will
increase on his own bid and decrease on other members’ bids in the same group.
The model also predicts that there exists an equilibrium where members bid higher
to more reciprocal leaders and more reciprocal leaders also reward more. We run a
pilot experiment to test for the predictions, where we observe consistent patterns.
A more complete experiment is needed in the future to investigate the per-
formance of the leaders and members in this environment and check the prediction
power of the theory. Moreover, the current theory is built based on the discretionary
reward option of the leaders. In reality, there exists other motivating scheme. For
example, in some environments, leaders can punish members after the competition.
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By checking the leaders’ behavior and the model’s implications in different environ-
ments, we can get a more complete understanding for the group competition, as
well as fir the performance of male and female leaders in providing discretionary
motives.
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Chapter 3: A Principal-Agent Problem with an Endogenous Task
Design
3.1 Introduction
Designing tasks, assigning them to employees for their jobs, and determining
how to monitor and pay the employees are central issues in modern firm theory.
An employer often evaluates and pays her employees by different measures in work-
places. Some jobs are paid and promoted by the completeness of many individual
tasks. For example, secretaries are being monitored and promoted based on the
completion of tasks including scheduling appointments and answering phone calls;
students are being graded based on tasks including midterm exam, final exam, and
homework. Meanwhile, some jobs are being measured and paid as a whole. For
example, some writers are being paid on a royalty based on the sales of their books;
plumbers are being paid on the completeness of plumbing. In observing these ex-
amples, one may naturally ask what properties of the jobs determine those different
payments, for example, should an employer divide a particular job into different
tasks or keep it as a whole in a single task? Should employees be paid for each task
or the completion of all the tasks? When can the employer choose the number of
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jobs to create and hence the number of employees to hire, how is this number being
determined, and how should the employer partition jobs into tasks on which the
payment can be conditioned?
The current research characterizes the optimal task and job design in a principal-
agent setting, while previous research about job design mainly focuses on how to
allocate exogenous tasks to employees without discussing the underlying reasons for
the formation of tasks. In particular, most of the literature assumes exogenous job
structure with symmetric tasks. However, in several applications, the principal (em-
ployer) often has some flexibility to decide the measurements on which the agents
(employees) will get paid on. For example, the employer can determine whether
to impose multiple tasks on different parts of the job and measure the employee’s
performance in each of them, or to check the completion of the whole job. Without
the endogenous task formation embedded in the model, the previous principal-agent
models cannot justify the assumption for symmetric tasks and can thus be regarded
as incomplete. The current chapter characterizes situations where a certain struc-
ture of tasks is optimal for the principal and hence provides a foundation for some
of the existing models.
To solve the principal’s problem, I build a model for a principal-agent problem
where the principal can assign parts of the effort space as agents’ jobs and partition
each part/job into tasks. The total effort on the effort space is T and the principal’s
goal is to incentivize agents to exert an exogenous D amount of effort, where D ≤ T ,
at the lowest cost. I also assume that the probability for each task to succeed or fail
is a function of the task’s incompleteness, which will be defined later. The hazard
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rate for the task return function to return a failure is assumed to be concave. Under
those assumptions, if the hazard rate for the task return function is an increasing
function of the task’s incompleteness, it is optimal to hire one agent, design the whole
effort space as a single task, and assign this to the agent as his job. Otherwise, if the
hazard rate for the task return function is a decreasing function, the principal should
just assign any hired agent the amount of effort that the principal wants this agent to
exert. In other words, in the equilibrium, there will be no incompleteness left in each
task after the agent exerts effort. Also in this case, there exist multiple equilibria
where it is optimal for the principal to hire any number of agents and partition
each of their jobs into any number of tasks where each of the tasks contains enough
amount of effort that can be exerted.
In Section 3.2, I introduce the related literature to the job design problem.
I then describe the model setting in Section 3.3. The principal’s problem in Task
Design Stage and Job Design Stage is solved sequentially in Section 3.4, following
by the conclusion in Section 3.5.
3.2 Literature Review
In most literature on the employment contracts, tasks are assumed to be ex-
ogenous. Holmstrom and Milgrom[35] paper is built on this setting, where they
assume that exerting specific effort increases the probability of success more than
other types of effort. This specific effort is thus more observable as the principal
only sees the successes and failures of tasks. Holmstrom and Milgrom[35] concludes
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that a fixed wage should be paid to avoid the situation that the more observable
effort crowds out the less observable one. As the function of observed outcome with
respect to effort is exogenous in [35], it does not embed the endogenous task design
in the model.
Dewatripont and Tirole [36] studies an advocate model, assuming a direct
conflict between two tasks (for example, prosecution and defense for a suspect on
the court). In their model, higher effort in one task will decrease the probability of
success in the other task so that an agent will not exert full effort if assigned both
tasks. Based on this setting, Dewatripont and Tirole [36] argues that it is optimal
for the principal to assign contradicting tasks to different agents as advocates. In
their model, this direct conflict between tasks, which affects tasks’ outcomes, is
exogenously imposed. As there is no formation of tasks, it does not address the
endogenous task design problem either.
Laux [37] discusses the optimal incentive scheme when there are multiple iden-
tical and independent tasks. In this model, as the agents are paid on the number
of successful tasks, it is optimal to assign tasks to one single agent as the agent can
be punished harshly for shirking by eliminating his payoff from all the tasks. Bond
and Gomes [38] imposes a budget constraint on Laux [37]’s model which limits the
maximum bonus that can be paid to the agent. As Laux [37] and Bond and Gomes
[38] focus on the optimal reward scheme with exogenous and identical tasks, their
models keep silent on the formation of tasks.
Abreu et al. [39] builds a model where players continuously make decisions
and receive accumulated information with a lag. It finds that shortening the lag of
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receiving information does not have a monotonic effect on the probability of agents’
cooperation, and there exists an optimal lag. Their model is dynamic, with effort
exerted continuously, and information received with delays. On the contrary, the
current model is a static one with outcomes from all tasks received by the principal
at the same time after the agent exerts effort. As a result, Abreu et al. [39]’s model
describes the frequency of monitoring instead of the formation of tasks compared
with the current model.
Another strand of the relevant literature is the information system literature
(see, for example, [40], [41]). In this literature, the principal-agent model consists
of two stages: the choice of an information system and the design of an optimal
incentive contract. Although this information system is endogenous, it is an abstract
mapping from agents’ action space to the space of outcome received by the principal.
It does not interact with the design of the contract due to the complexity of the
problem. As a result, it is not the same as the endogenous task design problem here.
3.3 Model Setting
This chapter has a simple principal-agent setting, where the principal aims to
minimize the cost to motivate agents to exert a given desired amount of effort on
an effort space. As in the standard moral-hazard model, the effort is not directly
observable. The principal can see whether a task succeeds or fails after the effort is
exerted, and reward each agent based on the outcomes of his tasks. Different from
traditional principal-agent models, in addition to the reward scheme, the principal
72
in this chapter also designs ’jobs’ and ’tasks’; she decides how much of the effort
space to assign to each agent as his job and how to partition each agent’s job into
multiple parts where each part corresponds to a task. Thus, there are two stages for
the principal to design jobs. (1) Job Design Stage: the principal decides the optimal
number of agents to hire, and how much of the effort space to be allocated to each
agent as his job. (2) Task Design Stage: the principal partitions the part of the
effort space which is assigned to each agent in Job Design Stage, and the elements
of this partition are the tasks for that agent. The reward scheme for each agent is
allowed to depend on the agents tasks designed on this Task Design Stage.
A structure of jobs and tasks on the two stages is illustrated in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Task and job structures
In Figure 3.1, I think of the effort space as an interval of real numbers with
length T . The principal assigns parts of this interval to agents as their jobs and
partitions each job to tasks. In this particular example, note that the principal
assigns three disjoint parts of the effort space to three agents as their jobs: Job 1,
Job 2 and Job 3, that is, these agents are hired. The three jobs can include different
amounts of effort that can be exerted, as shown in the different lengths of those
jobs on the effort space in Figure 3.1. The principal can further partition each job
into tasks. A job can include only one task as in Job 2 or can consist of multiple
73
tasks as in Job 1 and Job 3. Each task may include different amounts of effort,
represented by the tasks’ different length on the effort space in Figure 3.1. The
principal will supply an employment contract to each agent with a reward scheme,
specifying the payment to the agents based on the outcomes of his tasks. That is,
agent 1 will be rewarded based on the outcomes of the three tasks in Job 1, agent
2 will be rewarded based on the outcome of the single task in Job 2 and so on.
Given the principal’s goal to motivate agents to exert D, the reward schemes should
be designed to incentivize agents to exert this D amount of effort, and a properly
designed structures for jobs and tasks can decrease the cost for the principal. This
optimal structures of jobs and tasks will be investigated in this chapter.
The principal can hire as many agents as she wants, and can assign any disjoint
part of the effort space to any agent, as agents are all symmetric. After jobs are
designed, the principal and agents interact in a traditional way. There is a three-
period game between the principal and agents. The timeline of the game is shown
in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Timeline of the interaction between the principal and agents
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As shown in Figure 3.2, in the first period, the principal offers employment
contracts to a certain number of agents on the market, who accept or reject the jobs
offered. In the second period, an agent that accepts an employment contract decides
how much effort to exert in each task. In period three, the principal sees whether
each task succeeds or fails, and pays the agents according to their employment
contracts.
Next, I will give an example to illustrate the characteristics of this model and
how it corresponds to a problem in reality, and then the formal model settings and
notations will be introduced.
3.3.1 Example
Suppose that a power company wants to hire employees to maintain a trans-
mission line of electric power with length T . The company wants to incentivize
hired employees to check at least D length of the transmission line where D ≤ T ,
but cannot directly see whether the effort is exerted. Instead, it can assign each em-
ployee a part of the transmission line and partition each part further into separate
districts. Once there are one or more short occurring in one district, there will be
a outrage in the district which can be detected by the power company. Hence, the
employee who is in charge of the district can be punished according to the observed
outrage, and thus motivated to exert effort. The power company wants to find the
optimal number of employees to hire, how much transmission line to assign to each
of them, and how to partition those parts of the transmission line into districts to
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minimize its cost. The company can achieve this goal through following two stages.
On the Job Design Stage, the power company decides the number of employees
to hire, z. For any hired employee j, s.t. j ∈ {1, 2, ..., z}, the power company assigns
him a part of the power line with length T j as his job, s.t.
∑z
j=1 T
j ≤ T . With the
employment contract, agent j decides to check Dj length out of the power line in his
charge, s.t. Dj ≤ T j. As the power company wants the total length of power line





On the Task Design Stage, the power company partitions the job of employee











j. With the employment contract and the par-
titions of districts, the employee’s decision of checking Dj length of power line is





} length of power line to check in each of his districts, s.t.
dji ≤ t
j





j. Suppose that a short will only occur on
the district i’s range that has not been checked in a Poisson distribution. The event
rate for the Poisson distribution is λ, which represents the average number of shorts
occurred per unit of length unchecked. The probability of a outrage in the district i




i ). As can
be seen later, this probability of outrage occurring satisfies all assumptions for the
task return function in the current model. This power company’s problem can thus
be solved under the current framework, given the employees’ outside option for not
being hired by the power company is low enough.
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3.3.2 General Setting
A principal wants to hire agents to exert effort on an effort space with a total
amount of effort T . Her goal is to motivate agents to exert an exogenous D amount
of effort with the lowest cost, s.t. D ≤ T . There are an infinite number of agents
on the market that the principal can hire. Each agent can accept the employment
contract offered to him, or reject it and accept an outside option with a utility 0.
Both principal and agents are risk-neutral.
3.3.3 Job Design Stage
The principal assigns a part of the effort space with T j effort to agent j as




j ≤ T . Recall that in the power line example, T j is the length of
the power line that the company assigns to employee j, and the total length of the
power line is T . Note that the T j effort in agent j’s job will be further partitioned
into tasks on the Task Design Stage, which will be discussed later.
The principal designs an employment contract for agent j, which incentivizes
agent j to exert a total amount of Dj effort, s.t. Dj ≤ T j. So D = {D1, D2, ..., Dz}
represents the amount of effort that the z hired agents are incentivized to exert. Re-




j ≥ D in the equilibrium. Assume that agents are homogeneous and
pay the cost of effort Ψ(d) when exerting d amount of effort. I assume that the cost




is a general setting in the job design literature yielding an increasing marginal cost
of effort. γ > 0 measures how fast the marginal cost of effort increases with respect
to the total amount of effort exerted.
3.3.4 Task Design Stage
Consider an agent denoted by j who is assigned a job with the amount of effort
T j on the Job Design Stage. The problem for the principal on this Task Design Stage
is to partition the job into tasks to minimize the cost to incentivize agent j to exert
the Dj effort, which has been determined in the Job Design Stage. Corresponding to
the power company example, the company as a principal can partition each range
of power line maintained by an employee into districts, on which the employee’s
performance will determine the employee’s payoff.
Let tji denote task i for agent j in his job. Agent j’s job structure can be










j. Hence, the job structures for
all hired agents 1 to z can be denoted as t = {t1, t2, ..., tz}. Also, assume that the
number of tasks, yj, for any agent j is limited by a capacity constraint M , which
represents the maximal number of tasks that can be assigned to an agent, that is,
yj ≤ M for any j ∈ {1, 2, ..., z}. In the power company example, this M is the
maximum number of districts that can be assigned to an employee.
With the employment contract signed, agent j decides for how much effort dji
to exert in each of his tasks i ∈ {1, ..., yj}, s.t. dji ≤ t
j
i . Note that in this Task Design







where Dj is determined on the Job Design Stage. I can write the effort exerted by





). The effort exerted by all z hired agents
in their tasks can be denoted as d = {d1,d2, ...,dz}. Next, I will introduce the task
return function, with which a certain outcome is returned from each task.
3.3.5 Signaling Process
Task i for agent j returns a binary outcome of either failure or success to the
principal after the effort is exerted, that is, sji ∈ {0, 1} where 0 represents failure.





} denote the outcomes of the yj tasks assigned to agent j.
The probability for a task to return a certain outcome will be determined by the
task’s incompleteness as defined below.
Definition 1. (Task’s incompleteness) A task’s incompleteness is defined as
the total amount of effort in this task minus the amount of effort exerted by the





Recall that in the power company example, this wji is the district i’s range
that has not been checked by agent j. Assume that the probability of a task to
return a failure outcome is an increasing function on its incompleteness. Hence, the
more effort agent j exerts on the assigned task i and less incomplete task i is, task
i will be less likely to fail. I denote F (sji |w
j
i ) as the probability for an outcome s
j
i
to be returned by task i assigned to agent j, given the incompleteness wji for the
task. Moreover, assuming that the outcomes from different tasks are independently
distributed and their distributions are identical, the probability to receive a set of
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< 0. Denote Fd(s|w) =
∂F (s|w)
∂d
where w = t − d and Fw(s|w) = ∂F (s|w)∂w . Hence Fd(s|w) = −Fw(s|w). Once
Assumption 1 is satisfied, the probability function of tasks to fail satisfies Monotone













With MLRP, exerting extra effort in a certain task will increase the percentage
change in the successful rate more than that in the failure rate, which makes it pos-
sible for the principal to incentivize the agent to exert effort by rewarding successes.
As the reward scheme from the principal can only depend on the received
outcomes, it is a function from the outcome space to a positive real number for the
payment, that is, Rj : {0, 1}yj → R+. An employment contract can thus be denoted
as the combination of the agent’s job structure and the corresponding reward scheme:
{tj, Rj}. Further, I denote the hazard rate for the task return function to return
a failure as H(w) = Fw(0|w))
F (1|w) . Based on those notations, next I will impose some
structure on the model which will be useful in the characterization of the optimal
task design in a job.
Assumption 2. The hazard rate for the task return function to return a failure
is monotonic and concave with respect to the task’s incompleteness w, that is,
H ′(w) ≥ 0, ∀w ∈ [0, T ] or H ′(w) ≤ 0, ∀w ∈ [0, T ]; and H ′′(w) ≤ 0.
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Assumption 2 gives properties for a well-behaved hazard rate of the task return
function in later analysis. The set of probability functions with monotonic hazard
rate is rich as discussed in [42]. 1
In the power company example, the probability for a outrage on a particular
district of the transmission line, with wji of length unchecked, is a Poisson Probability
distribution with F (0|wji ) = 1− e−λw
j
i . As such a Poisson distribution has a hazard
rate H(wji ) = λ, it satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2.
Assumption 3. The hazard rate of the task return function is bounded from
above, i.e. H(x) ≤ H̃. 2
Assumption 3 makes sure that the principal pays a large enough wage to
incentivate the agents to satisfy the agents’ incentive-compatibility (IC) condition,
so that the agents’ individual rationality (IR) condition will not bind at this solution.
Otherwise, if the hazard rate of task return functions is greater than the given
threshold H̃, a small wage is enough to make sure that the agents will not shirk, as
shirking will rapidly increase the probability for the task to fail. As this little wage
may not be enough for the agent to choose the hiring contract over his outside option,
the principal’s optimal wage scheme will be determined by the agents’ individual
rationality (IR) condition. As this chapter focuses on the optimal job and task
structures to better incentivize agents, I rule out this case by limiting the size of the
hazard rate of the task return function in Assumption 3. 3
1The common families of probability distribution satisfying both Assumptions 1 and 2 include
the Gamma Distribution when α > 1, the Weibull distribution when 1 < p < 2, and some truncated
normal distributions.
2H̃ = 2D .
3The job structure determined by the agents’ IR condition is also not an interesting one. In
the model, since the agents’ cost of effort is quadratic, the total effort cost to exert a certain D
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3.4 Solution
Next, I will first solve the principal’s problem on the Task Design Stage to
partition tasks for a given job with a total amount of effort of T j and the desired
effort of Dj for the agent to exert. Then I will solve the principal’s problem on
the Job Design Stage by finding the optimal number of agents to hire (i.e., jobs to
create) and optimal T j and Dj for each of them.
3.4.1 Task Design Stage
On the Task Design Stage, the principal’s problem is to find the optimal
employment contract {tj, Rj}, given T j and Dj for the job. The optimal T j and
Dj for agent j will be solved in the next session for the Job Design Stage. The
principal’s problem on the Task Design Stage can be written as














































. So agents’ IR condition can always be satisfied by hiring a















d∗ji ) ≥ 0. (IR)
Proposition 1. Given the amount of effort T j in the job, the desired effort















) , if sj = {1, 1, ..., 1}
0, otherwise.





T j and tji ≥ T
j−Dj
yj
for any task i of agent j.
Proof. Replacing the agent’s (IC) constraint with its FOC condition 4 , the
above principal’s problem can be written as (3.1), subject to (3.2), (3.4), (IR), and



















dj∗i ), for all i, (IC’)





i ≥ Dj must bind in the solution to minimize the principal’s





into the right hand side of the (IC’) constraint. Summing all the (IC’) conditions
for i = 1, ..., yj, I get a relaxed (IC”) condition,
∑
sj















 = yjΨ′(Dj). (IC”)
4When Ψ′′(x) = γ is big enough, the agent’s problem in the IC condition is concave and the IC
constraint can be replaced with the FOC condition.
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I first solve the principal’s problem












with respect to (3.5), (3.4), and the relaxed condition (IC”), ignoring the (IR)
condition. Later, I can show that this solution satisfies the (IC’) and (IR) conditions.
Note that the left hand side of the (IC”) condition equals to the principal’s
















yj, tj∗ and dj∗, which can minimize this objective function while keeping the (IC”)

















































sji = 1. So given y















is the largest when
sj∗ = {1, 1, ..., 1}, compared with any other sj 6= sj∗.
This implies that given yj∗, tj∗ and dj∗, the principal should pay a positive
reward only when a series of outcomes sj∗ = {1, 1, 1, ...} is received for the relaxed
principal’s problem (3.7). In other words, the principal only rewards the agent when












Given (IC∗), to minimize Rj∗(sj∗)Πi∈{1,...,yj}F (1|wji ) for the principal’s objective
















is a concave function with respect to tj∗i −d
j∗
i by Assumption 2, it is optimal to have
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if T j −Dj > 0. Note that when the task incompleteness is symmetric for all tasks
in the optimal partition, the (IC’) condition is satisfied and can be written as







Now I will prove that such a set of symmetric task incompleteness can be





j and tji ≥ T
j−Dj
yj
. This can be seen
by checking the agent’s FOC,
Rj∗(sj∗)Πi∈{1,...,yj}F (1|wji )H(w
j
i ) = Ψ
′(Dj). (3.8)




i . Since R
j∗(sj∗)Πi∈{1,...,yj}F (1|wji )
is the same for all task i and H(wji ) is concave and monotonic on w
j
i , the agent j will
choose dji and d
j

















j and tji ≥ T
j−Dj
yj
for any task i of the agent.
Note that the left-hand side in the agent’s FOC (3.7) is the principal’s cost.






j and tji ≥ T
j−Dj
yj
is optimal, and the optimal
reward scheme is Rj∗ which rewards the agent only when all tasks are successful. The
principal’s choice of the optimal number of tasks yj∗ will be discussed in following
Lemma 1.
Now this solution can be shown to satisfy the (IR) condition as well. In the
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relaxed principal’s problem (3.7), agent j earns an expected payoff,











































Proposition 1 gives the properties of an optimal task structure for a certain
job, given the total amount of effort T j and the amount of effort that the principal
wants the agent to exert Dj. The optimal number of tasks in each job, however,
depends on whether the hazard rate is increasing or decreasing with respect to the
task’s incompleteness, as discussed in following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1.
(1). When Dj < T j,
• if the hazard rate of the task return function is an increasing function of the
task’s incompleteness, it is optimal to have one task in each job, that is, yj∗ = 1
if H ′(w) ≥ 0;
• if the hazard rate of the task return function is an decreasing function of the
task’s incompleteness, it is optimal to have the maximal possible number of
tasks in each job, that is, yj∗ = M if H ′(w) < 0.
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(2). When T j = Dj, it is optimal for the principal to partition agent j’s job
into any number of tasks once the total number of tasks is smaller than its upper
bound M .
Proof. From (3.7), the expected cost for the principal to motivate an agent














it can be easily seen that when T j − Dj > 0, to minimize the principal’s cost, it
is optimal to have the maximal possible number of tasks for the agent, that is,
yj∗ = M , if H ′(w) < 0. Otherwise if H ′(w) ≥ 0 and T j − Dj > 0, it is optimal
to have the minimal possible number of tasks, that is, yj∗ = 1 if H ′(w) ≥ 0. If
T j − Dj = 0, the choice of yj does not affect the principal’s cost so it is optimal
to partition the job into any number of tasks, once this number is smaller than its
upper bound M . Q.E.D.
Lemma 1 is obvious following the optimal task structure given in Proposition
1. By Lemma 1, the optimal number of tasks depends on whether the hazard rate
of the task return function is increasing or decreasing. For the former case, it is
optimal to have one single task in each job. Hence it can be seen that such a job
is measured and paid only on its final outcome, as in the earlier example of book
royalty where the agent is given one task as her job (i.e., finishing the book) and
rewarded only when the outcome of that task is successful. Otherwise, if the hazard
rate of the task return function is decreasing, it can be seen that the job is measured
and paid by the completion of multiple tasks, as in the example of grading for a
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student where there are multiple tasks counted such as submitting a project, writing
an exam, attending classes, and the student is graded based on the completion of
all the tasks.
3.4.2 Job Design Stage
With the optimal employment contract solved in the last section for the Task
Design Stage, the principal’s remaining problem is to choose how to assign the jobs,
that is, the optimal number of agents to hire, the optimal amount of effort T j in any
agent j’s job, and how much effort Dj to incentivize agent j to exert in the contract.
Given D desired amount of effort, the principal’s problem at the Job Design Stage
can be written as
















T j∗ ≤ 1
where y∗ is the optimal number of tasks for each job determined by Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. (1). When the hazard rate of the task return function de-
creases with the task incompleteness, there exist multiple optimal employment con-
tracts where the principal can hire any number of agents. The principal will require
each task to be performed completely, that is, T j = Dj for all j ∈ {1, 2, ..., z∗}.
(2). When the hazard rate of the task return function increases with the task in-
completeness, the principal will hire one agent and assign the whole effort space and
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incentivize this agent to exert the desired amount of effort, that is, z∗ = 1, T 1 = 1
and D1 = D.
Proof. Note that the constraint
∑z
j=1D
j∗ ≥ D must bind in the solution
for this cost minimization problem. Substituting Ψ′(Dj) = γDj into the objective
function (3.9) yields,
















T j∗ ≤ 1.
Also replacing T with T−D as a choice variable, I have

















(T j∗ −Dj∗) ≤ T −D.
This problem (3.10) can be solved by checking following two cases.
CASE 1. H ′(w) < 0.
When H ′(w) < 0, as T j − Dj ≥ 0, it is optimal to have T j − Dj = 0 for





) in the principal’s objective
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which is independent of the total number of agents hired, z, and how much T j = Dj
effort assigned to each hired agent j.
CASE 2. H ′(w) ≥ 0.
Prove that it is optimal to hire only one agent in CASE 2 by contradiction.
Suppose that there exists z > 1 agents in the optimal job assignment. Without loss
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So hiring z agents, s.t. z > 1, is dominated by hiring only one agent and assign him
all the effort space, which yields a cost D
H(T−D) for the principal. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states how the principal should assign parts of the effort space
to agents as their jobs, given the optimal employment contract solved in Proposition
1 and Lemma 1.
Proposition 2 depends on the quadratic cost function of effort. If the degree
of the polynomial for agents’ cost function does not equal to two, (3.11) no longer
holds for the principal’s cost. In other words, the number of agents hired does affect
the principal’s cost to incentivize D effort exerted. In this case, the principal may
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tend to hire more agents if the degree is higher than two or fewer agents if the degree
is lower than two.
Combining Proposition 2 with Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, we have the op-
timal job design for different jobs. If the hazard rate of the task return function
is increasing for one job, the principal should hire only one agent by Proposition
2. Also, with Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, only the final outcome of the job will
be monitored. This is consistent with the book royalty example, where the writer
is paid based on finishing of the writing and a book is usually written by a single
writer. If the hazard rate of the task return function decreases, the principal can
split the job among multiple agents and monitor each agent on several tasks. This is
consistent with the example of the secretary jobs. In reality, secretary jobs are paid
based on the completion of multiple tasks including answering phones and schedul-
ing meetings. Also, depending on the amount of work, multiple secretaries could be
hired, as predicted by Proposition 2.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate a two-stage job design problem where the principal
assigns parts of the project to agents as their jobs in the Job Design Stage and
partitions each job into tasks in the Task Design Stage. The model justifies the
optimality of symmetric partitions of tasks under certain conditions, and supplies
foundations for some of the previous literature. The model also offers condition for
the stochastic task return functions and explains when it is optimal to partition a
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job into several tasks or monitor it as a whole.
Based on those results, the job design problem can be further discussed, im-
plementing other possible situations. First, the effort in the current model is homo-
geneous. When there exist heterogeneous efforts, it is interesting to discuss the job
design further, that is, whether those different efforts should be partitioned into the
same or different tasks, and how this partition interacts with the job assignment
to different agents. Second, the current model is based on the assumption that the
hazard rate of tasks to fail is concave with respect to the tasks’ incompleteness. It
would be interesting to discuss the same problem when this assumption is relaxed,
for example, the hazard rate of the task return function could be convex. With a
convex hazard rate, one may guess that an asymmetric task structure will be pre-
ferred by the principal, i.e., some tasks will be larger than others even when all effort
is homogeneous. This result can shed a light on the existence of some asymmetric
task structure in reality. Finally, some other constraints can be added to the model,
for example, a budget constraint for the principal, or a binding outside option for
agents. With those situations discussed, the current model can explain more real-life
observations.
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Appendix A: Proofs in Chapter 1
A.1 Lemma 1
Proof. Note that if β ≥ σE
Γ
,
V 1(e2 = E|β) =
1
2
β2Γ2 − βΓσE − 1− σ
2
2





β ≥ (1− σ
2)E2
2(G− σEΓ)





















with Assumption 2. So I have







for self-employed workers with β ≥ σE
Γ































where the first inequality is because the employer’s profit from the contract C(β′),
Γe1(β









E2 − σΓE +G ≥ G− 1
2





E2, if β ≤ σE
Γ
,
















where the second in-
equality is by Assumption 2. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1





, ∀β ∈ H. So by (1.3), e2(β) = E,
∀β ∈ H.
Also, ∀β ∈ [β, 1] \H, e2(β) = E by Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
A.3 Preparation for Proposition 2 and Theorem 1
Lemma 3




























































, β′] must be indifferent between C(β′) and their own contracts. Recall-
ing the assumption that the workers will choose the contract with higher contracted







must sign the same contract, i.e. e1(β) = e1(β






The steps to prove Proposition 2 and Theorem 1 are as following. By firstly
showing the equilibrium e1(β) for the employees in h and H \ h in Claim 1, I can
prove the form of the optimal normalized utility, which can identify w(β) for the
employees in h and H \h in Claims 2-3. All the employees’ contracts are determined
except for the employees at the upper bound of each position β̄j. With Claims 1 to
3, proposition 2 can be proved by showing that all the workers in [β, β̃] will be hired.
And based on Proposition 2, the employee’s decision at β = β̄j can be determined,
which adds to Claims 1 to 3 and reaches Theorem 1.








, ∀β ∈ hj.
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, I have h = ∅ and the result
holds trivially.

















by Lemma 3. I can thus define h′1 s.t. h
′
1 = {β ∈ H | e1(β) = e1(β′1)}. h′1 is thus








by Lemma 3 while it is not sure whether
h′1 is closed or open at its upper bound β̄1 = sup{β | e1(β) = e1(β′1)}. Note that























if h′1 is open at β̄1. In either case, by Lemma 3, h
′
1 is a connected set,
i.e. e1(β) = e1(β
′
1), ∀β ∈ h′1.
From h′1, I can further identify a list of h
′











, denote h′j = {β ∈ H | e1(β) = e1(β′j)} with








by Lemma 3 and its upper bound β̄j = sup{β |
e1(β) = e1(β
′
j)}. Similarly, h′j is closed at βj while it is not sure by now whether
it is closed or open at β̄j. Also as in the h
′







, ∀β ∈ h′j. With





in the list of sets
{h′1, h′2, ...} where h′i∩h′j = ∅, ∀i 6= j and all employees in h′j sign the same contract.1
Define h = {h1, h2, ...} ⊂ H as a permutation of {h′1, h′2, ...} s.t. β̄j ≤ βj+1.










, ∀β ∈ H.





are contained in h in the above process,
1This argument requires that those h′j are countable, which holds by the countable chain con-













, ∀β ∈ H \ h. Q.E.D.
Note that it is not sure whether hj’s are closed at their upper bounds, i.e.













∀β ∈ hj ⊂ h, IR condition binds for all the contracts for {h1, h2, ...} and H \h . So if
I can prove that all the IC conditions also hold with (*), (*) must be the normalized
utility of employees in the optimal contract menu. To reach this goal, I will start
from the following Claim 2 to prove that with (*), an employee in H \ h will never
mimic another employee in H \ h.







employee with β ∈ H \ h will never mimic another employee in H \ h.
PROOF. We can see that there is no β term in U
0(β,β′)
β




























and the employee with β1 > β2 will never mimic the employee with β2 who exert a
lower contracted effort by Claim 1, for β1, β2 ∈ H \ h.
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by Lemma 2 and the employee with β1 < β2 will never mimic the employee with β2,
for β1, β2 ∈ H \ h. Q.E.D.
Based on Claim 2, Claim 3 continues to justify that the IC conditions with (*)
hold for all employees and (*) is the optimal assignment for employees’ normalized
utility given h and H.













∀β ∈ hj ⊂ h.
PROOF. We already know that a part-time employee in H \h will never mimic
another employee in H \ h by Claim 2. To prove the IC condition holds for any
part-time employee in H \ h, with Lemma 2, I just need to prove that the part-
time employee with β ∈ H \ h will never mimic any positioned employees with


























So the IC conditions hold for all β ∈ H \ h. Note that I do not need to consider the




















by Lemma 1, ∀β′ ∈ hj s.t. β′ ≥ β̄j > β.
To prove the IC condition holds for full-time employees in positions with β ∈







, ∀β′ < β
j
s.t. β′ ∈ H with (*). I have two cases for whether β′ ∈ h to check in
order to justify the above inequality.









































So IC conditions satisfy for β ∈ h and the employee with β would never mimic any
other employee.
As all IC conditions hold and IR conditions bind for all β ∈ H with (*) as
checked above, (*) is the normalized utility for employees in the optimal contract
menu. Q.E.D.
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A.3.1 Employer’s profit from contracts
With Claim 1 and Claim 3, from an employee with type β ∈ H who takes the
contract C = (e1, w), the employer earns a profit
π(β) = Γe1 − w













































(Γ− σE)(βΓ− σE)− 1
2
(βΓ− σE)2, if β ≥ σE
Γ
0, otherwise.
Ψ(β) and Φ(β) have the same maximal value (Γ−σE)
2
2
but Ψ(β) takes this maximal





= Γ−σE, i.e. β = ˆ̂β, and Φ(β) takes this maximal
value at the point when βΓ− σE = Γ− σE or β = 1.
Also, with Claims 1 and 3, I can uniquely identify the contract (ej1, w
j) for
each hj by its lower and upper bounds βj and β̄j. The employer’s profit from the










































Ψ(β)− Φ(β) is a quadratic function on β and
Φ
(















and Φ(1) = (Γ−σE)
2
2
> Ψ(1). Proposition 2 is based on β̃ identified.
A.4 Proposition 2
Proof. If β ≥ β̃, either H = ∅ or H = h because part-time employment
will not be profitable for the employer for any part-time employee yields profit
Ψ(β)− Φ(β) ≤ 0 for β ≥ β ≥ β̃. In the first case, β̄ = β̃ so H = [β, β̄] = ∅. In the
second case, ∀β′ ∈ hj ⊂ H = h, I must have βj < β̃ otherwise the contract would
not be profitable to the employer. As β̄j ≥ β′ ≥ β ≥ β̃, there is only one hj where
the employee with β′ can be. So j = 1 and H = h = h1 = [β1, β̄1]. Let β̄ = β̄1 and
Proposition 2 holds.
So I just need to consider the case when β < β̃. The result holds directly
following Claims 4.
CLAIM 4. [β, β̃] ⊂ H.
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PROOF: Prove by contradiction. Suppose ∃β′ ∈ [β, β̃] and β′ 6∈ H in an
optimal contract menu.
Note that the pecuniary effort exerted under self-employment for the worker
with β′ must be less than the maximal accepted effort in the contract by Assumption





as G > EΓ
2σ
. Construct a new contract menu M ′ which
is the same as M except including an extra contract (e′1, w











so the worker with β′ will take the new
















and also all employees with β > β′ must have e1(β) > e1(β
′) according to Claim 1.
Also, no employees with β < β′ will take this contract by Lemma 2. The
employer earns a positive profit from this contract (e′1, w
′) because it returns a
profit
π(β′) = Ψ(β′)− Φ(β′) ≥ 0
as β′ ≤ β̃. Q.E.D.
By above Claim 4, I can prove that H is connected as following. If ∃β′ > β̃
s.t. β′ ∈ H, β′ ∈ h because if β′ ∈ H \ h and β′ > β̃, π(β) = Ψ(β)− Φ(β) < 0, the
principal will be better off by not providing the contract for this β′. So ∀β′ > β̃ s.t.
β′ ∈ H, ∃hJ ⊂ h s.t. β′ ∈ hJ = [βJ , β̄J ] ⊂ h. In this case, I have βJ < β̃ otherwise
if β
J
≥ β̃, I have π(β) = Ψ(β
J
) − Φ(β̄J) < Ψ(βJ) − Φ(βJ) ≤ 0, and the employer
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is better off by not providing the contract for hJ . Notice that there could be only
one hJ with βJ < β̃ and β̄J > β
′ > β̃, so if ∃β′ > β̃ s.t. β′ ∈ H, H = hJ ∪ [β1, β̃]
with β
J
< β̃ otherwise H = [β, β̃]. H = [β, β̄] is connected in either case, with
β̄ = β̄1 > β̃ in the first case and β̄ = β̃ in the second case.
Q.E.D.
A.5 Theorem 1
Proof. By Claim 1 and Claim 3, any employee in [β
j
, β̄j) ⊂ hj ⊂ h must
sign the contract (ej1, w


















E2 − σΓ(E − β̄j) + 12(β̄j)
2. To prove Theorem 1, I just
need to check the workers’ behavior at the upper bound β̄j of hj ⊂ h with Claims
1-3 and Proposition 2.
(1). If β̄j = supH, by the tie breaking rule, workers at β = β̄j = supH will
choose employment so hj is closed at β̄j.
(2). If β̄j 6= supH and β̄j = βj+1, the worker at β = β̄j = βj+1 will choose the
contract in the higher hierarchy, (ej+11 , w
j+1). So hj is open at β̄j.
(3). If β̄j 6= supH and β̄j < βj+1, there must exist part-time employment for
workers in (β̄j, βj+1). Whether hj is closed or open at β̄j depends on whether the
employer supplies the part-time contract to the worker at β̄j. Note that the decision
of whether to supply this part-time contract yields the zero marginal profit to the
employer so in this case, the contracts menus with hj closed or open at their upper
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bounds are all in the set of optimal contract menu. It is safe to say hj = [β̄j, β̄j)
a.e. in this case.
Q.E.D.
A.6 Proposition 3
Proof. Prove by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a set (a, b) ⊂ H \ h
and Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β) < 0, ∀β ∈ (a, b) in the optimal contract menu M .
Consider a new contract menu M ′ same as M except for a range [β′, β̄′) ⊂














. Note when β = β̄′, M ′ is the same as the
previous contract menu M , where all employees in (a, b) are part-time employees.













∀β′ ∈ (a, b), taking derivative of the above employer’s profit with respect to
β̄j yields
[Ψ(β′)−Ψ(β̄′)]f(β̄′)− Φ′(β̄′)[F (β̄′)− F (β′)]
which equals to zero when β̄′ = β′.
Also, ∀β′ ∈ (a, b), taking second order derivative of the above employer’s profit
with respect to β̄j yields
−[Ψ′(β̄′) + Φ′(β̄′)]f(β̄′) + [Ψ(β′)−Ψ(β̄′)]f ′(β̄′)− Φ′′(β̄′)[F (β̄′)− F (β′)]
which collapses to −[Ψ′(β̄′) + Φ′(β̄′)]f(β̄′) > 0 when β̄′ = β′.
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When β̄′ = β′ ∈ (a, b), as the derivative of the profit function with respect to
β̄′ is zero and the second derivative with respect to β̄′ is strictly positive, it must be
more profitable to have β̄′ > β′ rather than β̄′ = β′. So the original contract menu
M is not optimal. Contradiction. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2.
Proof. If Ψ′(β̃) + Φ′(β̃) < 0, by the continuity of Ψ′(β) + Φ′(β), there must
exist a range (β′, β̃) ⊂ [β, β̃) s.t. Ψ′(β)+Φ′(β) < 0, ∀β ∈ (β′, β̃). So (β′, β̃) ⊂ h 6= ∅.
Q.E.D.
A.7 Proposition 4
Proof. With Theorem 1 and Propositions 1-3, the employer’s problem can
























where π(β) is the profit the employer earns from the worker with type β. Note that




































which is strictly positive with f(β
1















by Assumption 3. So β
1





























≥ β̄i,∀hi, hi+1 ⊂ h. (A.3)
Taking the derivative of β
1
on the objective function of employer (A.3) yields
[Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1)]f(β1) + Ψ
′(β
1
)[F (β̄1)− F (β1)] ≤ 0 (A.4)
where the inequality is from the constraint β
1
≥ β.
Because the first term in (A.4) is positive as β̄1 > β1, the second term must
be negative and thus Ψ′(β
1
) ≤ 0. As
Ψ′(β
1





























≥ Γ − σE,
∀β ∈ hj ⊂ h. Q.E.D.
Corollary 4.
Proof . Firstly if β ≤ β̃, the non-empty set [β, β̃] ⊂ H 6= ∅.
For the other direction, it is equivalent to prove if β > β̃, H = ∅. With
β > β̃, the employer will never supply part-time contracts which return profit π(β) =
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Ψ(β)−Φ(β) < 0 for any worker with β ≥ β > β̃. If supplying a positioned contract,
the employer earns profit Π(β) = Ψ(β
j





> β > β̃, by Proposition 4. Q.E.D.
A.9 Proposition 5
Lemma 4. If the distribution of β is uniform, (1) β̄j = βj+1, ∀hj, hj+1 ⊂ h;
(2) suph > β̃.




)−Ψ(β̄j)]f(β̄j)− Φ′(β̄j)[F (β̄j)− F (βj)]
= Ψ(β
j
)−Ψ(β̄j)− Φ′(β̄j)(β̄j − βj) ≥ 0. (A.5)
Taking derivative of β
j
yields
Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1) + Ψ
′(β
1
)(β̄1 − β1) ≤ 0. (A.6)
Adding (A.5) and (A.6) yields
[Ψ(β
j
)−Ψ(β̄j) + Ψ′(β1)(β̄1 − β1)] + [Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1)− Φ
′(β̄j)(β̄j − βj)]
which is strictly positive by the concavity of Ψ(β) and Φ(β). So the inequality of
(A.5) must be strict and the constraint β
j+1
≥ β̄j must bind.








)−Ψ(β̄j)− Φ′(β̄j)(β̄j − βj) ≥ 0. (A.7)
Taking derivative of β
j
yields
Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1) + Ψ
′(β
1
)(β̄1 − β1) ≤ 0. (A.8)
Adding the above two inequalities yields
[Ψ(β
j
)−Ψ(β̄j) + Ψ′(β1)(β̄1 − β1)] + [Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1)− Φ
′(β̄j)(β̄j − βj)] > 0
by concavity of Ψ(β) and Φ(β). So the inequality in the FOC w.r.t to β̄j when
β̄j = suph ≤ β̃ must be strict,
Ψ(β
j
)−Ψ(β̄j)− Φ′(β̄j)(β̄j − βj) > 0. (A.9)
I must have β̄j ≥ β̃ in the optimal contract menu.





























< β̃ and β̄J = supH ≥ β̃.
Taking derivative of β̄J yields
Ψ(β
J
)− Φ(β̄J)− Φ′(β̄J)[F (β̄J)− F (βJ)],
which is strictly positive when β̄J = β̃ because
Ψ(β
J
)−Φ(β̃)−Φ′(β̄J)[F (β̄J)−F (βJ)] = Ψ(βJ)−Ψ(β̃)−Φ
′(β̄J)[F (β̄J)−F (βJ)] > 0
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where the strict inequality is from (A.9) for hJ = supH ≤ β̃. So β̄J > β̃ and β̄J = β̄.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5
Proof . Prove by contradiction. Suppose there are more than two different hj’s
such that h = {h1, h2, ...} in the optimal contract M . I can denote h1 = [β1, β2) and

















As M is the optimal contract, the FOC of β
1










F (β̄1)− F (β1)
= 0 (A.10)
Now construct a new contract M ′ where h′j−1 = hj for j > 2 and h
′
1 = h1∪h2 =
[β
1
, β̄2). I then have the change in the employer’s total profit by applying M
′ as
































F (β̄2)− F (β̄1)
] [




F (β̄1)− F (β1)
− Φ(β̄2)− Φ(β̄1)




F (β̄2)− F (β̄1)
] [




F (β̄1)− F (β1)
−
Φ(β̄1)− Φ(β1)




F (β̄2)− F (β̄1)
] [













where the last equality is by (A.10), which is strictly positive by the concavity of
Ψ(β). This is a contradiction to M being the optimal contract. Q.E.D.
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Appendix B: Proofs in Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs








M(360− bj + rj) = 0.




−u′L(2580− r1 − r2 − r3) + γb1[u′M(360− b1 + r1)]
−u′L(2580− r1 − r2 − r3) + γb2[u′M(360− b2 + r2)]
−u′L(2580− r1 − r2 − r3) + γb3[u′M(360− b3 + r3)]
 = 0
where r = [r1, r2, r3]
T and b = [b1, b2, b3]
T .



































































L+ x1 L L
L L+ x2 L
L L L+ x3






































































































γu′M(π1)− x1 0 0
0 γu′M(π2)− x2 0










M(360− b1 + r1)]
b2[u
′
M(360− b2 + r2)]
b3[u
′
M(360− b3 + r3)]
 .
Proposition 1.
Proof. The FOC for optimal rj in the leader’s problem is
u′L(πL) = γbju
′
M(360− bj + rj)
for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Hence, we must have
γbju
′
M(360− bj + rj) = γbku′M(360− bk + rk)
for member j and member k in the same group s.t. rj, rk > 0. Without loss of
generality, suppose bj > bk. We thus have u
′
M(360 − bj + rj) < u′M(360 − bk + rk).
As members’ utility function is concave, we must have 360− bj + rj > 360− bk + rk


























) ∗ [γu′M(πj)− xj]


























)] (′M(πi)− xi) < 0
for i 6= j 6= k. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4.







M(360− b1 + r1)]
b2[u
′
M(360− b2 + r2)]
b3[u
′




























































> 0 as L < 0 and xj < 0 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Q.E.D.
B.2 Proof of Proposition 5
To prove Proposition 5, we need Lemmas 1-4 for preparation. Among these,
Lemmas 1-3 can be derived from the properties of the leaders’ reward function. The
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members’ problem will not be introduced until Lemma 4.
Lemma 1. A leader with higher reciprocal level γ will increase her/his reward to
member j, rj, faster as the member’s bid bj > b increases than those with lower





















































which increases on γ. By symmetry of r1, r2 and r3,
dri
dbi
increases on γ for any

































































the LHS of above inequity is positive when R converges to zero. So the inequity
holds when R is small enough, for example, there exists a R′ > 0 such that when






























The term in the square brackets, γu′M(π1)− x1, can be written as
γu′M(π1)− x1
= γu′M(π1)− γb1u′′M(π1)
= γRe−Rπ1 + γb1R
2e−Rπ1 .





























Note that when R converges to zero, dr1
db1
converges to infinity. So when R is small
enough as in Assumption 2, γu′M(π1)− x1 is positive and decreasing on b1.














where L = u′′L(πL) and xj = γbju
′′
M(πj).










































































































































< 0 by Lemma 3, with Assumption 5. Q.E.D.
The members’ strategy in the pure strategy equilibrium takes different forms





1 < b2j = b
2 and b1j = b
2
j .
Case 1. b1 > b2.






P1uM(360− bj) + (
1
2




P1uM(360− bj) + (
1
2
P1 + 1− P1)
∫
uM(πj(bj, γ))fj(γ|G1)dγ.
Taking derivative of bj yields FOC,






































uM(360− bj + r(bj, γ))fj(γ|G2)dγ.
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Case 2. b1 < b2.





















for member j with leader’s gender G2.
Case 3. b1 = b2.
When b1 = b2, the member j’s problem when facing a leader with gender





























fj(γ|i)dγ = 1. (B.5)
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.
Proof. We will prove this Proposition 5 by checking two possible cases and show
that an equilibrium with b1 ≥ b2 exists in either case.
1. There exists bj = b











when bj = b




































we must have b2 < b1. Otherwise we will have b2j = 0. In either case, b
2
j = b
2 ≤ b1j =
b1.
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Because the left hand side of the above inequality is continuous on bj, we must have
either















−1 , ∀bj ∈ [0, 360]. In the first case, bj = b
1 = 360 so b2 ≤ b1 must hold. In the





















so bj = b
2 = 0 and b2 ≤ b1 holds as well. Q.E.D.
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x1 + L L L
L x2 + L L
L L x3 + L
 .
Using linear row reduction to find the inverse matrix, we have
x1 + L L L 1 0 0
L x2 + L L 0 1 0





x1 −x2 0 1 −1 0
L x2 + L L 0 1 0




x1 −x2 0 1 −1 0
0 x2 −x3 0 1 −1














0 x2 −x3 0 1 −1
L L x3 + L 0 0 1










0 x2 −x3 0 1 −1
0 L+ Lx2
x1





























































































































































In this step, we already get the last row of the inverse matrix of Df(r,b,γ)
Dr
. By the
symmetry of the matrix and r1, r2, r3, we will directly know the other rows of the































































































Note that this matrix is symmetric.
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